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Toni Marie Waggoner 
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This research analyzed the effect that the General State Aid (GSA) 
Property Tax Extension Limitation Law adjustment and Hold Harmless 
component had on equity in the Illinois General State Aid funding system.  The 
equity criteria defined in the study were permissible variance, wealth neutrality, 
and conditional wealth neutrality.  This study consisted of four simulations.  First, 
baseline indices were calculated for the Illinois GSA funding system for 2000 to 
2011.  Second, the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law adjustment (PTELL) 
was eliminated, the associated cost savings used to increase the GSA 
foundation level, and new equity indices were calculated.  Third, the Hold 
Harmless component was eliminated, the associated cost savings were used to 
increase the foundation level, and new equity indices were calculated.  Finally, 
the PTELL adjustment and Hold Harmless component were both eliminated, the 
combined cost savings were used to increase the GSA foundation level, and new 
equity indices were calculated.  The simulated indices were compared to the 
  
baseline values to determine the effect on equity. 
The permissible variance criterion was measured using the Mcloone Index 
and coefficient of variation.  A simple regression coefficient was used to measure 
the wealth neutrality criterion.  Finally, the conditional wealth neutrality criterion 
was measured using the change in R2 from a 2-step multiple regression 
(controlling for local tax rate). 
Some major findings of the study included: 
1.  Unit school districts were more equitable than elementary and high 
school districts across all equity measures and simulations. 
2.  High school districts were the least equitable of all school district types. 
3.  The simulations that included the elimination of the PTELL adjustment 
improved the equity in the Illinois funding system across all measures and school 
district types. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
STATEMENT AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
The United States Constitution specified certain responsibilities and 
functions of the federal government.  It did not address education.  The 
responsibility for providing education to the residents of the country was clarified 
by the Tenth Amendment. 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people (the Constitution of the United States of America).  
 
The education of residents is necessary for an informed citizenry and 
participation in a democratic society.  Therefore, the responsibility for education 
was delegated to the individual states.  According to Wise (1972): 
Education is a function of the state.  From this it follows that the state 
acting through its legislature or its constitution may retain unto itself the 
necessary authority to maintain and operate schools, or it may delegate 
such authority to other agencies. . .  . (p. 100) 
 
Education requires funding.  Because all states specify education as a primary 
responsibility in their constitutions, theoretically, 50 different school funding 
systems may exist throughout the nation.  As a primary function of the state, 
public education is funded in various ways.  Many states have relied on local 
property tax revenue to fund education.  However, local municipalities are not 
equal in their capacity to pay for public education.  As a result, funding disparities 
across school districts emerged and continued to grow larger.  Most states have 
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experienced problems in trying to equalize education funding for all students.  
Illinois is among those states for which legislators have attempted to create 
mechanisms for funding school districts equitably.     
Researchers and legislators tend to focus on state interventions for public 
education within their state, but the federal government has also contributed to 
policy making for education.  For more than 40 years, the federal government 
has been concerned with issues pertaining to special assistance for poverty 
students (Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965), obtaining equality of 
education for all persons (Coleman Report, 1966; National Institute of 
Education), assessing the achievement progress of all students in the nation 
(Contract with ECS to create NAEP in 1969), funding appropriate services for 
students with disabilities (Special Education Act of 1975), and in 2001 further 
attempting to assess/monitor student achievement with the passage of the law 
entitled No Child Left Behind (NCLB).  Although it seems that the federal 
government tends to be interested in special policy issues instead of general 
ones, Wise (1979) quoted Joseph M. Cronin, first appointed State 
Superintendent of Education of Illinois, as writing: 
The pleas for “local control” or the slogan, “education belongs to the 
states,” may be uttered, even shouted, back home.   But slowly, 
inexorably, and incrementally, the federal government is taking over 
education.  Especially since 1965, the country has moved—almost every 
year—toward a national system of education.  Furthermore, the potential 
opposition has almost conceded the inevitability of the trend.  (p. 50) 
  
Usually state and school district personnel do not resist receiving federal money; 
however, the critics charge that either the amount is insufficient to achieve the 
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purpose of the mandate or there are too many sanctions tied to the revenue.  In 
Fiscal Year 2011, there was $28.1 billion dedicated to funding elementary and 
secondary education in Illinois.  The federal government contributed 12.3% of the 
total amount; the state of Illinois provided 33.1%; and the local resources 
(property taxes and corporate personal property replacement taxes) provided 
54.6%.      
In reviewing the funding strategy used by the states, it appears that state 
leaders attempt to obtain as much from the federal government as they can, 
contribute what they have available from state sources to local school districts, 
and let local property taxes continue to fund education at an increasing rate.  
This is exactly the situation in Illinois.  The disparity in per student spending in 
Illinois has continued to increase as local property tax revenue has continued to 
increase. For example, in Fiscal Year 2000 the range of per student spending for 
elementary school districts was $13,884 but increased to $18,902 in Fiscal Year 
2011.  Similarly, for high school districts, the range increased from $12,267 to 
$16,650 for the same two years.  Unit school districts increased the least of the 
three district types by increasing to $10,907 from $7,596.  Appendix A shows the 
minimum and maximum values by school district type.   
In 1984, Berne and Stiefel published a text that defined various categories 
of equity principles (horizontal, vertical, and equal opportunity) and summarized 
various indices (e.g., range, restricted range, McLoone, coefficient of variation, 
etc.) for measuring student funding equity.  General state aid formulas are 
usually designed to address horizontal equity, which is defined as the equal 
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treatment of equal students.  The amounts generated by the various general 
state aid formulas are referred to as a basic funding amount per student.  This 
basic amount precedes the addition of any categorical funding for students 
needing additional resources (e.g., special education, limited-English fluency, 
poverty, etc.).  The purpose of categorical funding is designed to address vertical 
equity, which is the unequal treatment of unequal students.  These categories of 
equity are discussed in more detail in this chapter.   
In Illinois, many committees/commissions/task forces have been created 
to study school funding.  Some of the more well-known reports include the 
Report of the Illinois Task Force on School Finance (January 1993), Report of 
the Governor’s Commission on Education Funding for the State of Illinois (March 
1996), and Recommendations for Systemic Reform of Funding for Elementary 
and Secondary Education in Illinois (Education Funding Advisory Board October 
2002).  Many times improved student funding equity has been a desired 
outcome.  Although many reports have been produced, few of the proposed 
solutions have been implemented by the Illinois General Assembly to improve 
the equity of funding in its public school funding system.  There seems to be two 
main reasons for this lack of action.  The first is that the proposals can be very 
costly, and the legislators are unable to secure the funding.  The second reason 
is the inability of legislators to agree on the best course of action.  This failure to 
act has produced cynicism among school practitioners.  The typical response 
given by school district personnel when a committee finalized a report was “here 
is another document for a bookshelf somewhere.”  Also, there have been many 
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lawsuits generated regarding inequitable funding, which resulted in several states 
being ordered by the court to reform their school finance systems.  Some of the 
states most notable for court ordered reform are California, Kentucky, Ohio, New 
York, West Virginia, Wyoming, and most recently Kansas in March 2014.   
Five lawsuits have been brought against the State of Illinois related to 
school funding.  The first case was McInnis v. Shapiro in 1968.  Arthur Wise 
published Rich Schools, Poor Schools in 1967.  The question that Wise wanted 
to address was whether the Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection clause) of 
the United States Constitution could be used as a foundation in a lawsuit when 
there were unequal expenditures per pupil due to inequity in funding.  The 
McInnis v. Shapiro lawsuit in Illinois was the first to test the theory set forth in 
Rich Schools, Poor Schools.  The Illinois Supreme Court found in favor of the 
defendants, although it agreed that poorer districts should have additional 
funding and that the inequality in the system was a result of local control.  The 
justices decided this issue should be resolved by the legislators and not the 
judges.  The United States Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s opinion.  
The second case was Blasé v. Illinois in 1970.  This lawsuit was based on 
the same premise as the first case, but the plaintiffs argued that the new 1970 
constitution adopted by the State of Illinois had stronger language to support their 
lawsuit.  According to the plaintiffs, the language in the new constitution required 
the State to have the primary responsibility for funding education.  The reliance 
on the local property tax worked against equity in the funding system because 
property taxes were not uniformly distributed.  Once again the court decided in 
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favor of the State of Illinois.  The basis of the decision was that Article X of the 
Illinois Constitution was a goal and not a mandate.   
The third lawsuit, Committee v. Edgar, found its way to the Illinois 
Supreme Court in 1996.  The plaintiffs made similar arguments from the earlier 
cases but added the concept of “adequacy.”  The twist to this new argument was 
that the Illinois funding system did not provide the necessary resources for 
economically disadvantaged students.  The court found that the State of Illinois 
was not in violation of the constitution and part of the basis for the decision was 
the notion of “local control.”  It was during this time period that the emphasis 
started to shift from equity to adequacy in Illinois.  This shift also paralleled the 
economic decline in the states as they struggled with having sufficient money to 
pay for state services.   
The fourth lawsuit, Chicago Urban League v. State of Illinois, was filed in 
2008.  There were two claims to the lawsuit.  The first claim was based upon the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the second was 
based on the Illinois Civil Rights Act.  In April 2009, the first claim was dismissed 
but the second claim was left alive.  The Urban League has not taken any further 
action. 
The fifth lawsuit, Carr v. Koch, was filed in 2010.  In this lawsuit, the 
complaint was also based on the Equal Protection Clause, but specifically 
regarding the local property tax structure.  The court granted the motion to 
dismiss in 2010.  The plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their appeal to the appellate 
court in 2011.  In 2012, the Illinois Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s petition 
  
7 
 
for Leave to Appeal.  The Illinois Supreme Court held that the complaint had 
been properly dismissed for lack of standing.         
Problem 
Funding of public school students in Illinois is not considered to be 
equitable.  Two researchers, Professors Alan Hickrod and Ben Hubbard, 
conducted many seminal research studies through the Center for the Study of 
Education Finance at Illinois State University from 1973 to 1997.  The majority of 
these studies focused on the equity (or lack of equity) of the Illinois GSA funding 
system.  Education groups, legislators, school district administrators, and 
teachers have continued to pursue education funding reform for more than 30 
years.  The overriding themes for the various funding reform proposals have 
been increased student equity, less reliance on local property taxes, and a higher 
adequate level of funding.  The concept of adequacy is defined as the necessary 
level of funding to allow students to achieve at a specific level.  Although 
adequacy is an important concept in school finance, it is not addressed by this 
study.  Equity is examined because the Illinois General State Aid formula is 
based upon an equalization of state and local funds, and it is important to 
analyze how well that equalization factor works.  
In looking at how Illinois compares to other states, a 2007 survey 
conducted by Verstegen and Jordan (2009) indicated that all but five states 
distributed general state aid based upon an equalization formula.  The five states 
that did not utilize an equalization formula were Connecticut, Hawaii, North 
Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin.  Equalization formulas are attempts by states 
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to increase student equity by equalizing state and local resources.  Even with 
these equalization formulas, Illinois and many other states continued to have a 
problem with equitable funding of students.  Local resources outpace state 
resources, and the general state aid formulas are unable to achieve an equalized 
level.  This is exactly the situation that has developed in Illinois.  In 2010-2011, 
the local property tax revenues collected by school districts had grown to $15.4 
billion and the state revenue appropriated for the Illinois General State Aid (GSA) 
formula was $4.6 billion, yet the total $4.6 billion for GSA has not been equalized 
in the formula.  There are actually three parts to the GSA program.  The first is 
the foundation formula (also includes an alternate method and flat grant), which 
cost $3.23 billion in Fiscal Year 2011, and is the only part of the program that is 
equalized.  Second is the poverty grant formula that cost $1.35 billion in Fiscal 
Year 2011 and is a separate calculation to the foundation formula.  Finally, the 
prior year audit adjustments cost $22 million in Fiscal Year 2011.  This meant 
that in Fiscal Year 2011 the Illinois GSA formula attempted to equalize $3.23 
billion in state revenue with $15.4 billion in local revenue.  Local property wealth 
is not evenly distributed across the state, which only adds to the disparity and 
inequity.  Some areas of the state have greater access to revenue-producing 
facilities, businesses, or other resources.  The problem is not new and has been 
studied at great length over the last four decades.  However, as adjustments 
(such as the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law adjustment or Hold Harmless 
component) are made to the GSA formula, it is important to measure how they 
affect the overall equity of the system.   
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Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact that the Property 
Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL) adjustment and the Hold Harmless 
component of the General State Aid Formula have on the equity of the Illinois 
funding system.  The timeline for the study was determined to be Fiscal Years 
2000 to 2011.  The two adjustments examined in this study have different 
timelines, which complicated the decision.  The Hold Harmless component began 
with the revised General State Aid formula in Fiscal Year 1999 and was 
eliminated in Fiscal Year 2011.  The Property Tax Extension Limitation Law 
(PTELL) adjustment was adopted in the General State Aid (GSA) Formula in 
2000 and is still in existence.  Since Fiscal Year 2000 is the first year that both 
adjustments were included in the GSA formula, the decision was to make that the 
beginning point for the study.  The ending point was a little more complicated to 
determine.  There were major decreases to the GSA appropriation in Fiscal 
Years 2012 and 2013.  However, the foundation level was left at $6,119 rather 
than being reduced to fit the appropriation.  That means the GSA formula was 
calculated with an unfunded level and then the final payments were prorated.  
Because this could skew the equity indices, it did not seem feasible to include 
those years in the study.  Although the Hold Harmless component was eliminated 
in 2011, the PTELL adjustment had an associated cost of almost $700 million 
dollars, so it seemed logical to end the study with Fiscal Year 2011. 
 An equalization formula is used in Illinois to distribute state aid funds.  
Legislators adjust the formula from year to year to modify for a particular group of 
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students or in response to a specific issue.  For example in Fiscal Year 2002, the 
General Assembly changed the pupil count used for GSA to be the higher of the 
current average daily attendance or the 3-year average.  This modification to the 
formula helped school districts that had declining pupil counts.  Also, there was a 
modification to the formula in Fiscal Year 2004 when the Department of Human 
Services poverty count replaced the Decennial Census poverty count.  This 
modification was generally beneficial to school districts that had an increasing 
poverty student population by utilizing a more current student count.  There have 
been two adjustments to the Illinois formula that are particularly interesting with 
respect to student equity.  These adjustments are for PTELL and Hold Harmless.  
It is important to determine how these specific adjustments of the General State 
Aid formula affect equity because the intent of the system is to equalize state and 
local revenue.  More detail is given for these adjustments later in this chapter.  
In Illinois, PTELL is a new complication to an old equity problem.  PTELL 
was passed in 1991 (35 ILCS 200/18-185) to address taxpayer complaints 
regarding substantial increases to local property taxes without voter approval of a 
tax referendum.  PTELL limits the increase of local property tax revenues from 
one year to the next.  Legislators complicated the equity situation by passing 
PTELL to limit the amount of local revenue that school districts can receive but 
adjusted state aid as an attempt to offset the local loss.  Beginning in Fiscal Year 
2000, Illinois’ GSA formula was adjusted for PTELL.  There has not been a study 
to determine what effect this PTELL adjustment had on the equity of the funding 
system in Illinois.  This study purports to identify the effects on equity created by 
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the use of the PTELL adjustment. 
The addition of the General State Aid Hold Harmless component began in 
Fiscal Year 1999.  This component holds districts constant to the amount of GSA 
they received in Fiscal Year 1998 if the current year calculation yields less for 
them.  Although the amount needed to fund the Hold Harmless component is 
much less than the amount for the PTELL adjustment, it still counteracts the 
equalization function of the GSA formula by providing additional funding apart 
from the equalization function. 
Equity criteria, such as wealth neutrality (equal opportunity) and 
permissible variance (horizontal equity), are examined to see how well the 
funding system is working to achieve student equity.  The concept of wealth 
neutrality refers to making school district expenditures (or revenues) less a 
function of district wealth.  Permissible variance refers to reducing the disparity in 
expenditure per pupil among the school districts.  The measures are compared 
with and without the PTELL adjustment and the Hold Harmless component in the 
GSA formula to examine what impact these adjustments have on equity.  
Berne and Stiefel (1984), Guthrie, Garms, and Pierce (1988), Hickrod and 
Hubbard (1977), Hickrod and Chaudhari (1997), Odden (1992), Odden and Picus 
(1992), Wise (1972, 1979), and many others have conducted studies over the 
last three decades that have focused on the equity, or lack of equity, in various 
funding mechanisms.  More recently, studies by Figlio (1995), Hylbert (2001), 
and Rudow (2003) investigated the effects of PTELL at the local level.  Yet no 
studies have investigated the impact that the PTELL adjustment and GSA Hold 
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Harmless component have on equity in the Illinois funding system.  
Illinois Funding Framework 
This section describes the current funding system in Illinois that is 
examined in this study.  The local side of the funding framework consists of the 
property tax system, corporate personal property replacement tax, and the 
PTELL Law.  On the state side, there is General State Aid and General State Aid 
Hold Harmless.  This section also contains the background of the Education 
Funding Advisory Board (EFAB).  The Illinois statute (105 ILCS 5/18-8.05) estab-
lished EFAB in 1997, and members were appointed in 2000.  The statute has 
specific guidelines on how EFAB is to generate the foundation level recommend-
dations to report to the General Assembly for Illinois public school districts. 
Local Property Tax System 
In Illinois, the main components of the local property tax system are 
equalized assessed valuation (EAV), tax rates, levies, and extensions.  The 
property tax cycle for a school district begins with school district personnel filing a 
levy (request for money) for each taxable purpose (e.g., Educational, 
Transportation, Working Cash, Tort Immunity, IMRF, etc.).  The county clerk 
finalizes the EAV for the school district and then calculates a tax rate for each 
purpose by dividing each individual levy by the EAV.  The county clerk is 
responsible for ensuring that each resulting tax rate is not larger than the 
district’s authorized rate for each purpose.  Most of the tax purposes have a 
maximum rate either by statute or voter referendum.  The tax extensions are 
calculated and then the tax bills are prepared and mailed to the taxpayers (Illinois 
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Department of Revenue website).   
In areas of the state where there was rapid growth in EAV, the taxpayers 
saw higher tax bills each year without a voter referendum authorizing an increase 
to the tax rate.  The impetus for the PTELL law was to limit those increases to 
normal inflation and slow down the increase in property taxes.  Other aspects 
that complicate the local property tax system are Property Tax Appeal Board 
decisions, Certificate of Errors reports, tax increment financing districts, 
enterprise zones and the classification system in Cook County.  These additional 
complications are beyond the scope of this study.   
Property Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL)   
The purpose of creating PTELL was to address the issue of large 
increases to property tax extensions (revenue that the school district receives 
from local property taxes).  According to the Illinois Department of Revenue 
(IDoR),  
The PTELL slows the growth of property tax revenues to taxing districts 
when property values and assessments are increasing faster than the 
rate of inflation.  As a whole, property owners have some protection from 
tax bills that increase only because the market value of their property is 
rising rapidly. (p. 7) 
   
PTELL limits the increase to the annual property tax extension to 5% or the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), whichever is less.  The CPI has only been greater 
than 5% one time since PTELL was adopted and that was the first year (1991).  
The CPI has ranged from 0.1% to 4.1% since that first year (see Appendix B for 
the annual CPI values).  Therefore, the CPI has been used as the inflation factor 
in the PTELL calculation for every year except 1991.  Although this limitation has 
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been referred to as “tax caps,” that description is somewhat of a misnomer.  It is 
not the amount of taxes, rates, or EAV that are capped but the increase in the 
amount of property tax extension. 
County clerks calculate a limiting rate for each school district to enforce 
PTELL.  The limiting rate is the maximum aggregate rate (not including any 
bonds that a district may have) that a district may extend.  The general formula 
for the limiting rate is: previous year tax extension * (1+CPI)/current year 
adjusted EAV.  If a school district passes a tax rate referendum, that will factor 
into the numerator of the limiting rate formula.  The county clerk ensures that the 
aggregate rate resulting from the school district levy does not exceed the limiting 
rate (Illinois Department of Revenue, p. 14).    
As a result of taxpayer pressure, legislators passed the PTELL to limit the 
increase of the property tax extension from one year to the next.  However, 
because there is no provision in the PTELL statute to limit the growth of the EAV, 
a district may have a large increase to the EAV but not be able to access it with 
their aggregate local tax rate.  As EAV increases the local tax rate decreases.  If 
the tax extension is thought of as a constant, then the EAV and aggregate rate 
are variable.  If the EAV increases, then the rate must decrease to yield the 
constant dollar amount, and vice versa.   
PTELL was legislated for the collar counties (DuPage, Kane, Lake, 
McHenry, Will) in 1991 and for Cook County in 1994.  All other county boards 
were allowed to place a referendum on the ballot to let the county residents 
decide whether they wanted the local governments of the county to be subject to 
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PTELL.  Appendix C contains a list of Illinois counties that have taken action with 
respect to PTELL.  According to the list, six counties had legislation passed that 
subjected them to PTELL, 33 of the remaining 96 counties passed PTELL from 
1997 to 2003.  There are 54 counties that have not voted on the issue and 9 
counties where the referendum failed to pass.  Since 2003, no referendums have 
been attempted.    
PTELL has caused at least three problems for school districts.  The first 
problem is that the district is limited in how much the tax extension is allowed to 
increase each year, and, therefore, the school district does not have the increase 
in property tax revenue as it once did.  The second problem is that if district EAV 
is increasing at a rate higher than inflation then it is unable to utilize its authorized 
tax rate.  Third, now that some districts have been subject to PTELL for more 
than 15 years, an unintended consequence is that many of the local school 
district tax rates have declined substantially.  This is especially a problem in 
school districts where their extended rate is below the formula rate used in 
General State Aid (GSA).  These districts may not receive as much local revenue 
as the GSA formula assumes. 
Illinois General State Aid 
Illinois has had a foundation formula since 1927 except for the years 
1980–1998.  During this time period the General Assembly implemented a 
guaranteed tax base formula.  The guaranteed tax base included a constant 
valuation per pupil and tax rate by school district type.  The basis of a foundation 
formula is a basic level amount (foundation level) that is guaranteed by a 
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combination of state and local funds.  A foundation formula is utilized to equalize 
resources (state and local) and in theory the foundation level amount is an 
“adequate” or “minimum” level of funding.  Although the variables used in the 
foundation formula are the same (pupil count, tax rate, EAV, and foundation 
level), there have been many different ways to define them.  In prior formulas the 
pupil count was adjusted by grade level weightings (25% more for each high 
school student and 5% for each junior high student) and poverty count of pupils.  
Tax rates used in the formula have changed over time as well as the source of 
the poverty count of pupils.  Also, earlier formulas did not have a foundation level 
specified in statute.  Prior to Fiscal Year 1999, a state appropriation was made 
for the General State Aid formula, and when all of the data (pupil counts, EAVs, 
poverty counts, etc.) were finalized the foundation level was calculated.  The 
current General State Aid formula has a foundation level that is specified in 
statute (105 ILCS 5/18-8.05) and the state appropriation should be based upon 
the amount of revenue necessary to fund that foundation level.   
In Fiscal Year 1999, there was a major revision to the GSA formula.  
Instead of a guaranteed tax base, the GSA formula became a foundation 
formula, and many key parameters (pupil count, grade level weightings, poverty 
calculation, and formula tax rates) were changed.  The new formula is based 
upon an unweighted best three months average daily attendance as the pupil 
count; the poverty students are accounted for in a separate formula; and there is 
a foundation level specified in statute.  In Fiscal Year 2000, an adjustment for 
PTELL districts was added to the formula parameters.  In Fiscal Year 2011, the 
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associated cost of the PTELL adjustment was almost $700 million dollars and the 
total cost associated with the adjustment from Fiscal Year 2000 to Fiscal Year 
2011 was $5.14 billion.     
Also in 1999, a Hold Harmless component was added in the statute for the 
new formula parameters.  While the GSA Hold Harmless component was 
eliminated in Fiscal Year 2011, the total cost associated with the component from 
Fiscal Year 2000 to 2010 was $403.7 million.  The Hold Harmless component 
states that if a school district’s current calculation of GSA is less revenue than it 
received in Fiscal Year 1998 then a Hold Harmless payment will be made to 
make up the difference.  In theory, this component is utilized to allow a school 
district time to adjust to a change in a funding formula.  It was logical to include 
such a provision when there were major changes to the GSA formula in Fiscal 
Year 1999.  However, no sunset provision (i.e., a date for terminating the 
provision) was provided in statute and so the Hold Harmless component 
remained intact and continued to be applied annually through Fiscal Year 2010.  
As it is, most Hold Harmless districts had built this amount into their budgets and 
had come to depend upon it for operating expenses.  Although, the Hold 
Harmless component did not account for a significant amount of state revenue it 
did, to some extent, have a disequalizing effect because it provided additional 
revenue to a school district after the funding had been equalized through the 
foundation formula.           
The major components to the GSA formula are equalized assessed 
valuation (EAV) and pupil count (best three months average daily attendance—
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ADA).  The EAV is utilized to determine the district wealth.  The corporate 
personal property replacement taxes (CPPRT) is also included in the definition of 
local resources.  The more local resources a district has, the less it receives from 
the state and vice versa.  The GSA foundation level is assumed to be the amount 
necessary to educate a regular student (theoretically an adequacy level).  
Because some students require additional resources (special education, limited-
English fluency, poverty, etc.) there is also categorical funding available.  This 
categorical funding is usually reimbursement based upon a specific service or 
population and is not equalized against local revenue.  
Equity Principles   
According to Webster’s Dictionary the definition of equity is:  “1. the quality 
of being fair or impartial; fairness; justice.  2. something that is fair and just.”  It is 
important to understand that equity does not necessarily mean equal, but it does 
mean fair.  Berne and Stiefel (1984) summarized all the principles of student 
equity under three main categories: horizontal equity, vertical equity, and equal 
opportunity.  Horizontal equity is concerned with the equal treatment of equals.  
This simply means that all students are equal and should be funded at the same 
level.  When thinking about horizontal equity it is not about believing that all 
students are equal but that there is a basic amount that is necessary for all 
students.  Vertical equity is based upon the unequal treatment of unequals.  The 
premise of this concept is that some students need additional resources to be 
able to achieve their potential.  These students are viewed as unequal due to 
legitimate educational differences, such as non-English speaking, special 
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education, gifted, poverty, etc.  Some examples of illegitimate differences are 
geography, family income, race, and gender.  Equity principles do not allow for a 
difference in funding per pupil based upon illegitimate differences.  Categorical 
funding addresses the vertical equity where special populations may require 
additional resources.  These additional resources are in addition to the basic 
level discussed under horizontal equity.  Equal opportunity is usually defined to 
mean that all students have the same choices and resources available to them.  
There have been many definitions attributed to this concept, but according to 
Berne and Stiefel (1984): 
The principle can be formulated in a negative way: there should not be 
differences according to characteristics that are considered illegitimate, 
such as property wealth per pupil, household income, fiscal capacity, or 
sex.  For example, this principle requires that there be no relationship 
between expenditures, resources, programs, outcomes, and per-pupil 
wealth or fiscal capacity. (p. 17) 
 
Most general state aid formulas (including the Illinois formula) are devised 
to address horizontal equity.  Because the purpose of this study was to analyze 
the student equity of the Illinois GSA funding system, horizontal equity and equal 
opportunity were the main focus of this study.  The criterion used in the study to 
address horizontal equity was permissible variance.  This criterion refers to the 
disparity in expenditures per pupil among school districts.  Wealth neutrality was 
used to measure equal opportunity.  This criterion refers to the relationship 
between expenditures and wealth.  Vertical equity was not included in this study 
because the GSA formula does not address it.  
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Research Questions 
Two major adjustments were made to the GSA formula legislated in Fiscal 
Year 1999.  These are the PTELL adjustment and the GSA Hold Harmless 
component.  Because the GSA formula is an equalization formula, it is important 
to ascertain the effect of the adjustments to the equity of the funding system.  
The following research questions were framed to investigate the effect of each 
adjustment individually and then in combination.  The comparisons were made to 
the equity indices of the system as it existed from Fiscal Year 2000 through 
Fiscal Year 2011. 
1. What were the equity indices in the Illinois GSA funding system from 
Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2011 as computed by the four 
standard equity measures: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, 
simple regression coefficient, and multiple regression change in the 
coefficient of determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and 
differences in the results? 
 
2. When eliminating the PTELL adjustment in the Illinois GSA formula and 
holding the entitlement constant by increasing the foundation level, 
what are the equity indices in the GSA funding system from Fiscal Year 
2000 through Fiscal Year 2011 as computed by the four standard equity 
measures: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, simple regression 
coefficient, and multiple regression change in the coefficient of 
determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and differences in the 
results? 
 
3. When eliminating the Hold Harmless component in the Illinois GSA 
formula and holding the entitlement constant by increasing the 
foundation level, what are the equity indices in the GSA funding system 
from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2010 as computed by the 
four standard equity measures: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, 
simple regression coefficient, and multiple regression change in the 
coefficient of determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and 
differences in the results? 
 
4. When eliminating the PTELL adjustment and Hold Harmless component 
in the Illinois GSA formula and holding the entitlement constant by 
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increasing the foundation level, what are the equity indices in the GSA 
funding system from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2010 as 
computed by the four standard equity indices:  McLoone Index, 
coefficient of variation, simple regression coefficient, and multiple 
regression change in the coefficient of determination (R2)?  What are 
the similarities and differences in the results? 
 
5. What are the similarities and differences in the equity indices between 
and across the different simulations? 
 
Based on the findings from the five research questions, a discussion 
proposes what education policy implications may be possible for Illinois school 
funding. 
Definition of Terms 
The terms used in this study are defined as the following: 
Average Daily Attendance—The term average daily attendance, as used 
in the Illinois General State Aid Formula, is defined as the average of the highest 
three months of student attendance for the school year.  
Available Local Resources—The term available local resources, as used 
in this study for calculating the unrestricted revenue, is defined as local property 
tax revenues (utilizing a formula tax rate) and Corporate Personal Property 
Replacement Tax. 
Collar Counties—The term collar counties is defined to include the 
counties that surround Cook County.  They include DuPage, Kane, Lake, 
McHenry, and Will. 
Conditional Wealth Neutrality—The term conditional wealth neutrality 
refers to making expenditure less a function of wealth while controlling for 
operating tax rate. 
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Corporate Personal Property Replacement Tax (CPPRT)—Replacement 
taxes are revenues collected by the state of Illinois and paid to local governments 
to replace money that was lost by local governments when their powers to 
impose personal property taxes on corporations, partnerships, and other 
business entities were taken away.  CPPRT is considered to be local revenue in 
the General State Aid calculation. 
Equity—Equity is defined as the equality of educational opportunity as 
delineated by permissible variance, wealth neutrality, and conditional wealth 
neutrality. 
Equalized Assessed Valuation—Equalized assessed valuation is the 
school district’s assessed valuation of property after being adjusted for the 
county multiplier and is used to determine the district’s wealth. 
General State Aid Formula—General state aid formula is defined as one 
of the three formulas (foundation, alternate method, and flat grant) utilized to 
calculate state aid for school districts.  
Local Property Tax Revenue—Local property tax is defined for this study 
as the district’s equalized assessed valuation multiplied by the operating tax rate 
divided by 100. 
McLoone Index—The McLoone Index is defined for this study as the ratio 
of the actual sum of unrestricted revenue per pupil for all districts below the 
median to the total unrestricted revenue per pupil if all those districts were at the 
median. 
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Operating Tax Rate—The term operating tax rate is defined as the total 
tax rate less the bond and interest rate. 
Permissible Variance—The term permissible variance as used in this 
study refers to reducing the disparity in expenditure per pupil among the school 
districts. 
Property Tax Extension Limitation Law—A law that caps the extension for 
all governmental bodies in counties that are subject to the provisions. 
Unrestricted Revenue—Unrestricted revenue is defined for this study as 
the sum of General State Aid, local property tax, and corporate personal property 
replacement tax. 
Wealth Neutrality—The term wealth neutrality refers to making district 
expenditures less a function of district wealth. 
Delimitations 
The delimitations of this study are as follows: 
1.  The two equity principles to be examined are horizontal equity and 
equal opportunity.   
2.  Equity measures used in the study are the coefficient of variation, 
McLoone Index, regression coefficient, and change in R2. 
3.  The adjustment in the General State Aid Formula for the Property Tax 
Extension Law is specific to Illinois. 
4.  Illinois has three types of school districts: unit, high school, and 
elementary.  Because each district type has a different taxing base and taxing 
authority the equity indices have to be calculated within district types. 
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Limitations 
1.  This study and its findings are specific to Illinois. 
2.  Property Tax Appeal Board decisions, Certificate of Errors reports, tax 
increment financing districts, enterprise zones, and the classification system in 
Cook County are all complications to the property tax system but are not included 
in this study. 
3.  There was no attempt to account for consolidation or annexation of 
school districts during the time period (Fiscal Year 2000–2011). 
4.  This study did not address adequacy or efficacy of the Illinois General 
State Aid formula; although, these are important measures by which state 
formulas can be evaluated. 
5.  The complexity of the Illinois General State Aid formula prevents the 
investigation of all the various provisions of the formula as they impact the full 
range of equity in Illinois public education. 
Assumptions 
The assumptions for the study include: (a) revenue is a valid measure of 
expenditure; (b) data are accurate for the years of study; and (c) education policy 
making is informed by research on effects of laws. 
Significance of the Study 
The GSA formula is the only state distribution formula in Illinois that 
equalizes state and local revenue.  The revenue used to fund the GSA formula is 
not sufficient to overcome the large variation of the local property tax among 
school districts; however, it can be adjusted to make progress toward student 
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equity.  As the call for equity in school funding continues to grow, it is important 
to know how the various adjustments to the GSA formula impact equity.  The 
equity measurements for the Illinois funding system have continued to 
deteriorate.  No studies have been conducted to determine if adjustments or 
modifications made to the GSA formula have contributed to the deterioration of 
equity.  This study was conducted to determine the impact that the PTELL 
adjustment and the Hold Harmless component in the GSA formula had on the 
equity of the funding system.   
Summary 
Chapter I has described the current education funding system in Illinois 
and the equity problem that exists.  The study investigates two parts of the 
General State Aid formula to determine the effect they have on student equity.
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
There are three purposes of this chapter: (a) the problem detailed in 
Chapter I is expanded; (b) the conceptual framework utilized in this study is 
described; and (c) the studies conducted on the Illinois school funding system by 
researchers in Illinois and others, using Illinois data, are reviewed.  The review of 
the related literature culminates in the rationale and need for this study.     
Summary of the Problem 
The funding of public school students in Illinois is not considered to be 
equitable.  In Chapter I, several reports were cited where student equity was a 
main focus and proposals were made to improve student equity in the Illinois 
funding system.  According to studies conducted by Dr. Hickrod at the Center for 
the Study of Educational Finance at Illinois State University, equity indices had 
been worsening, for the most part, in Illinois.  Because the main function of the 
foundation formula is to equalize funds, it is important to investigate what effect 
changes to the formula have on equity of the system.        
There have been two major adjustments to the current General State Aid 
formula:  the Hold Harmless component (adopted with the new formula in Fiscal 
Year 1999 and eliminated in Fiscal Year 2011) and the Property Tax Extension 
Limitation Law (PTELL) adjustment (adopted as part of the formula in Fiscal Year 
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2000).  Although the initial associated cost of these adjustments was 
insignificant, the combined cost of $5.54 billion over the 12-year time period has 
accounted for a substantial amount of state revenue.  To describe this issue and 
investigate the problem, equity will be used as the conceptual framework. 
Conceptual Framework 
To describe a problem to be investigated, it is necessary to use a 
conceptual framework—a lens that provides a focus for the study.  Equity was 
the lens used for this study.  In defining a framework for equity for this study, 
Berne and Stiefel (1984) used four questions to develop their equity framework: 
1.  Equity is defined how? 
2.  Equity for whom? 
3.  Equity of what? 
4.  Equity is measured how? 
Equity Defined 
Beginning in the 1970s, school funding equity came to the forefront in the 
courts and the research arena.  Originally, equity was defined to be equal dollars 
regardless of any student differences.  However, it is important to understand 
that the definition of equity (with regard to school funding) has evolved and is 
thought of as being fair rather than just equal dollars.  In major studies, one way 
researchers have tried to analyze equity is to examine the extent to which 
students have equal opportunities.  This analysis makes sense because the 
property tax wealth is not evenly distributed across the state, which means that 
the local revenue varies among school districts.  As a consequence, the 
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distribution of state funds needs to be modified to equalize the total funding to 
school districts and offset the variance in local property wealth.   
There are also the complexities of what is considered to be fair and 
whether student differences (e.g., poverty, special education, limited-English 
fluency, etc.) encourage different levels of funding.  To address these 
complexities, three principles are defined for equity:  horizontal equity, vertical 
equity, and equal opportunity.  Horizontal equity is defined as the equal treatment 
of equals.  Horizontal equity is considered in state equalization formulas and is 
thought of as a base amount that every student should be entitled to.  Vertical 
equity is defined to be the unequal treatment of unequals.  The concept of 
vertical equity includes categorical funding to provide extra resources to students 
with legitimate differences.  These differences could be for special education, 
limited-English fluency education, at-risk services, transportation, remediation, 
etc.  In the case of vertical equity, there is the expectation of varied levels of 
resources.  Equal opportunity is usually defined to mean that all students have 
the same choices and resources available to them.  The concept of equal 
opportunity has played a major role in litigation brought against state funding 
systems.  The basis of these lawsuits is that the geography of a student’s 
residence should not impact the opportunities that are available to the student.  
As mentioned earlier, the property tax revenue is highly disproportionate across 
the state, so it is important that students in poorer property tax districts still have 
educational opportunities.  The focus of this study was to analyze the horizontal 
equity and equal opportunity in the Illinois funding system.  Vertical equity was 
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not examined in this study because it is a principle of categorical funding for 
student differences and not the General State Aid formula.  
Equity Target 
There are two main targets for school funding equity:  taxpayers and 
students.  Taxpayers expect to be treated fairly regardless of the amount of 
property wealth for the community.  They also expect that the same tax effort 
should yield the same result of revenue.  Examining student equity, it can be 
expected that each student has the same amount of resources available 
(regardless of where the resources come from).  State legislators are concerned 
with both of these groups and must balance the issues and compromise when 
passing legislation that affects both of them.  However, the state education 
agency is concerned with the equity of students, because the education of Illinois 
students is its primary interest.  This study focused on the student equity of the 
state funding system.   
Equity of What Resources 
Local school districts have access to state, local, and federal resources to 
provide services for their students.  The federal resources are categorical funding 
that can only be used for specific purposes or populations.  State funding 
consists of categorical funding and general state aid.  General state aid provides 
a base amount for each student.  In Illinois, the General State Aid formula has a 
foundation level specified in statute that is based on a combination of state and 
local funds.  Local resources are mostly general funds (can be used for any valid 
school expense) but they can also consist of revenue that is considered 
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categorical by nature (such as special education, transportation, etc.). 
Because this study utilized the horizontal and equal opportunity equity 
principles, the categorical funding was not considered in the resources for school 
districts.  As mentioned earlier, categorical funding is considered when analyzing 
the vertical equity principle.     
 Equity Criteria 
To determine whether a funding system is equitable, there must be some 
criteria with which to define equity.  In 1984, Berne and Stiefel were instrumental 
in defining equity concepts with regard to school finance and developing a frame-
work for the measurement of those equity concepts. With regard to state systems 
in the 1970s through the mid 1980s, Berne and Stiefel (1984) concluded:   
Equity is continuously assessed in many states, particularly when the 
state’s policymakers contemplate changes in the state’s school-financing 
system.  For example, during the last decade, over half of the fifty states 
have “reformed” their state finance systems by changing the way in which 
state aid is distributed.  Equity goals usually comprise a significant 
component of the rationale for these changes. (p. 217) 
 
Even though there is a framework in which to measure equity, the first decade of 
the 21st century is almost complete, and there is still a struggle with attaining 
equity in school funding. 
The equity criteria used in the study were permissible variance and wealth 
neutrality.  Permissible variance addressed horizontal equity—the equal 
treatment of equals.  Wealth neutrality addressed equal opportunity—ultimate 
goal is no unfavorable relationships (such as wealth of a school district and 
resources per pupil).      
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Permissible variance.  The goal of this equity criterion is to have little or 
no disparity in expenditure per pupil.  Two indices were used to measure permis-
sible variance:  the McLoone Index and the coefficient of variation.  The McLoone 
Index is based upon the amount of dollars needed to bring the bottom half of the 
population up to the median level of expenditures.  The index was operationally 
defined as the ratio of the actual revenues of the school districts below the 
median to the sum of the revenues needed to bring those school districts up to 
the median level by school district type.  The closer the index is to 1, the closer 
the system is to perfect equity.  The formula for the McLoone Index is: 
                                                                              j                      j 
(∑ PiXi ) / (Mp ∑ Pi )                 
                                                                            i =1                          i =1 
 
Where Pi is the number of pupils in district i; Xi is the average revenue per pupil in 
district i and Mp is the median revenue per pupil by school district type.  Districts i 
through j are below Mp. 
The coefficient of variation was operationally defined as the standard 
deviation of the revenue per pupil divided by the mean and multiplied by 100.  
The coefficient of variation was also calculated by school district type.  The closer 
the coefficient is to zero the less variation there is in the revenue variable and the 
greater the equity.  The formula for the coefficient of variation is the standard 
deviation of the revenue per pupils by school district type divided by the 
mean revenue per pupil by school district type multiplied by 100: 
                   _ 
SD / Xp * 100 
  
32 
 
Wealth neutrality.  The goal of this equity criterion is that expenditure is 
not a function of district wealth.  In this study, it was operationalized as a simple 
regression.  The closer the regression coefficient is to zero, the closer the state is 
to meeting this equity goal of being wealth neutral.  Two regression models were 
defined to measure this criterion.  Log 10 transformations were performed on all 
of the variables in the regression models to help mitigate the effects of the 
outliers on the results.   
The first model was a simple regression, where revenue per pupil was the 
dependent variable and the district wealth was the independent variable.  District 
wealth was defined as the equalized assessed valuation per pupil.  The 
regression formula was defined as: 
Y = a + bX 
where Y was the revenue per pupil, X was the district wealth (EAV per pupil), b 
was the regression coefficient. 
The second model was a multiple regression where revenue per pupil was 
the dependent variable and district wealth and operating tax rate (OTR) were the 
independent variables.  According to Schmink, Halinski, Hickrod and Hubbard 
(1979) and Hinrichs (1982), this definition has been referred to as conditional 
wealth neutrality because the goal is to determine the effects of district wealth 
while controlling for tax rate (effort).  This means that the effects of the OTR were 
accounted for so it could be determined how much of the remaining variation in 
expenditure can be attributed to district wealth.  There were two steps to the 
multiple regression.  The first step was to have revenue as the dependent 
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variable and OTR as the independent variable.  The R2 indicated the amount of 
variability in revenue that could be associated with OTR.  The second step had 
both OTR and wealth (EAV per pupil) as independent variables and the R2 
indicated the amount of variability in revenue that was associated with both OTR 
and wealth.  Step one R2 subtracted from step two R2 yielded the change in R2, 
which was the measure of the relationship between revenue and wealth 
(Schmink, Halinski, Hickrod, & Hubbard, 1979).  Again, the smaller the value of 
the change in R2, the closer the state is to being conditionally wealth neutral (a 
weaker relationship between revenue and wealth).  The formula for the multiple 
regression model was: 
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 
where Y was revenue per pupil, X1 was EAV per pupil, and X2 was OTR. 
There were three reasons for choosing the Mcloone Index, coefficient of 
variation, regression coefficient, and change in R2 to measure the equity criteria.  
First, the Illinois funding system consisting of local property taxes, corporate 
personal property replacement tax, General State Aid, and General State Aid 
Hold Harmless is based upon an equalization function that strives for horizontal 
equity and equal opportunity.  The McLoone Index and coefficient of variation are 
both cited in Berne and Stiefel’s (1984) framework as appropriate measures for 
gauging horizontal equity.  Second, the literature supported the use of these 
measures as they had been used in many equity studies within the field.  Finally, 
the Illinois State Board of Education routinely used these measures (except for 
the change in R2) in analyzing the funding system.  Thus, they are understood to 
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be valid and reliable measures of horizontal equity and equal opportunity and 
allow for comparison to previous studies. 
Summary 
The importance of investigating these formula adjustments is twofold.  The 
first reason is that there has been criticism for many years that equity in Illinois 
school funding needs to be improved.  Studies have been completed, 
commissions have been created, and reports have been written that analyzed 
school funding equity and provided recommendations to improve student equity 
in Illinois.  Yet, when adjustments have been made to the equalization formula in 
the funding system, there have not been any follow-up analyses to determine the 
impact of these adjustments on the equity goals of the state. 
Second, the foundation formula used in Illinois is based upon equalizing 
local and state revenue, but two adjustments work against the equalization 
factor.  The PTELL adjustment can decrease the local resources that are utilized 
in the GSA formula (for school districts subject to local tax limitations) that could 
result in an increase to the amount of GSA.  This means that some of the GSA 
appropriation would be used to offset a local loss for some school districts rather 
than increasing the foundation level.  The Hold Harmless component provides 
additional state revenue to some school districts after the calculation of the 
equalization formula.  The GSA formula is the only state distribution formula that 
equalizes state and local revenue.  It is important to know how various 
adjustments made to the GSA formula impact the overall student equity of the 
system.  This study is important because it analyzes the effect, on selected 
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equity measures, of two main adjustments to the GSA formula that have utilized 
a large portion of the GSA appropriation over a 12-year time period. 
Previous Studies 
The studies reviewed were based upon equity analyses of Illinois funding 
systems.  Four categories described the purposes of the studies: (a) historical 
studies of Illinois funding, (b) equity studies of a specific Illinois funding system, 
(c) studies analyzing a new equity measure/funding system in Illinois, and (d) 
comparison studies of Illinois funding system to other states.  In some instances 
studies may overlap categories.  This section contains a review of the studies 
organized by the categories and support for the importance of this study. 
Historical Studies of Illinois Funding 
James Ward (1987) conducted a review of the school funding structures in 
Illinois from 1927 to 1987 and discussed political aspects of school funding.  In 
Illinois, a foundation formula approach has been used to fund school districts 
since 1927, with the exception of 1980 through 1998.  In 1972-1973, the 
governor, state superintendent, and legislators each appointed a committee to 
study school funding reform.  In 1973 a compromise was reached by combining 
elements from each group.  A senior legislator was quoted by Hickrod, 
Chaudhari, and Hubbard (1985) as saying, “Well, Illinois has done it again.  We 
always pass a Christmas tree with a gift hung on it for everybody.  Then we 
figure out the wiring later“ (p. 2). 
In 1973, legislators passed the reform to adopt the Resource Equalizer 
formula (a foundation formula and flat grant were optional formulas included in 
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the law), which is a guaranteed tax base with a property tax rollback component.  
The Resource Equalizer formula guaranteed a tax base level for each school 
district type (levels were specified in statute) that was used in the calculation of 
general state aid.  However, before the Resource Equalizer formula was fully 
implemented, the legislators repealed parts of the formula and effectively created 
a guaranteed tax base (GTB) formula.   
Studies by Hickrod, Chaudhari, and Hubbard (1985) and Hinrichs (1982) 
detailed the revisions to the Resource Equalizer formula during 1976 to 1980.  
There were two main provisions to the 1973 reform: a property tax rollback and a 
reward for effort component.  The problem was that the two main provisions were 
not compatible.  It is difficult to have a formula that provides required property tax 
relief for high tax school districts while also providing additional state funds for 
school districts taxing at higher rates (reward for effort).  In 1976, the property tax 
rollback was repealed and a one-year hold harmless was added to the funding 
system.  The foundation formula (Strayer-Haig) was modified in 1978 allowing 
wealthier school districts to access increased state funds and the hold harmless 
was continued at 90% of the prior year claim.  In 1979, the foundation formula 
was increased again and the Resource Equalizer formula was fully operational 
(there had been a 3-year phase-in).  The final blow to the 1973 reform came in 
1980 when the reward for effort component was eliminated by making the tax 
rates in the Resource Equalizer formula constant.  Essentially this modified the 
guaranteed tax base formula to be algebraically the same as a foundation 
formula.  With the elimination of the optional formulas (foundation, alternate 
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method, and flat grant), the modified guaranteed tax base formula became the 
main formula.  However, to ensure that all school districts would receive some 
general state aid a new alternate method formula was adopted for the property 
wealthy school districts.  The formula in place in 1980 was nothing like the 
formula adopted under the 1973 reform.  According to Ward (1987),  
The 1973 reform did seem to increase equity in school spending 
throughout the state and, as such, represented a positive move toward 
reform.  Changes in the formula later in the 1970s weakened the 
equalization elements and by 1980 the state of Illinois had reverted to 
a “politics as usual” approach to funding public schools. (p. 109) 
  
In 1986, there was an increased effort for school funding reform and creating a 
new general state aid funding formula.  The goal was to have a funding reform 
proposal ready for passage during the 1987 legislative session.  During this 2-
year period, many hearings were conducted, councils created, and groups 
merged to develop new funding strategies for the state.  The Illinois Problems 
Commission had been in existence since 1949 but in 1985 the General Assembly 
eliminated it and all permanent commissions.  A new council was created to 
replace the Illinois Problems Commission.  It was the Citizen’s Council on School 
Problems.  The members were legislators but, unlike the Illinois Problems 
Commission, it did not have an appropriation to fund staff.  Dr. Alan Hickrod and 
Dr. James Ward provided assistance to the council.  Several public hearings 
were conducted to obtain feedback on how the funding formula should be 
revised.  It appeared that much of the testimony centered on special interest 
funding rather than the revision of the general state aid formula.  The intent of 
council members was to make a report to then Governor James Thompson on 
  
38 
 
how the state funding formula should be revised.   
Also during this time, other meetings were being conducted on state 
school finance issues.  In June of 1986, Governor Thompson, along with various 
education groups, conducted a seminar to discuss school funding.  State and 
national experts were invited to attend.  In the fall of 1986, the Illinois State Board 
of Education Advisory Committee on Financing Public Education created a set of 
principles that the state could use when formulating its strategy for funding public 
education.  The School Finance Advisory Panel was created as another 
mechanism to promote school funding reform.  The members consisted of 
education and non-education interest groups.  They held two meetings but did 
not seem to make much progress.  Two education groups, The Illinois 
Association of School Boards and Illinois Association of School Administrators, 
combined forces to create 14 guiding principles that the state should use in 
funding education.  These principles centered on adequacy and equity of 
education funding.  Their 10th principle states:  
Equity should be approached through increasing the state’s contribution 
rather than reducing local funds for education or reallocating the state’s 
contribution. (Ward, 1987, p. 116) 
 
Even with all the attention given to funding reform and the effort that was 
expended by the various groups during this 2-year period, there was no funding 
reform implemented.  It was concluded that this was, in part, because of the lack 
of state revenue to implement the reform and lack of consensus on what the 
reform should be.  Governor Thompson’s tax increase failed to pass and the 
current funding formula was left intact.  It seems that a lingering question from 
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Dr. Ward was: how long can a policy issue be kept viable and in the mainstream 
of discussion?  Would there still be discussions of school funding reform or did it 
end here? 
During this period of increased activity of trying to bring about school 
funding reform, the legislators passed legislation to sunset the current funding 
formula in 1987.  Because no consensus was reached by the various groups, the 
sunset legislation was repealed and the modified guaranteed tax base formula 
remained in place.  In 1990 the discussion of school funding reform ignited again, 
and legislative action created a task force to study school finance.  In 1993 the 
final report (Report of the Illinois Task Force on School Finance) contained 
several recommendations such as adopting a foundation formula to distribute 
general state aid, utilizing a regional cost adjustment, devising a methodology to 
determine an adequate level of funding, defining the equity goal as “leveling up” 
by decreasing the variation in expenditure per student, modifying the local tax 
structure, providing property tax relief, and including a permanent hold harmless 
(for general state aid).   
No action had been taken on the recommendations of the legislative task 
force, so in 1995 the Governor created another group (the Governor’s 
Commission on Education Funding) to study school finance reform.  In 1996 a 
report was released that detailed the recommendations from the commission.  
These recommendations included a foundation formula to distribute general state 
aid, a methodology to determine an adequate level of funding, a $4,225 
foundation level (based upon a pilot study), a statute to specify the methodology 
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(not a foundation level), property tax relief, a reduction in revenue per pupil 
disparity by “leveling up”, a separate poverty grant, creation of a regional cost 
adjustment, and accountability of school funding and performance. 
Finally in 1997, legislation was passed that included some recommenda-
tions from the previous reports.  Hinrichs (1998) compared the new funding 
formula to the existing modified guaranteed tax base formula.  Beginning in 1999 
general school funding would be distributed through a foundation formula with a 
statutory level of $4,225.  The grade level and poverty weightings of the existing 
formula were eliminated and a separate poverty grant was created.  Two 
additional formulas (alternate method and flat grant) were adopted to ensure all 
school districts would receive general state aid.  Also included was a hold 
harmless clause that would keep school districts from losing general state aid 
from the previous year.  Another part of the statute created the Education 
Funding Advisory Board (EFAB).  The responsibility of EFAB is to make 
recommendations regarding the foundation level and student poverty grant every 
2 years.  The foundation level recommendation is to be based upon a 
methodology that was prescribed in statute.  Although the same basic formula is 
in place, there have been revisions since 1999.  
Equity Studies of a Specific Illinois Funding System 
Hickrod and Hubbard (1977), Hickrod, Chaudhari, and Lundeen (1980), 
and Hickrod, Chaudhari, and Hubbard (1985) examined funding reform in 1973 
to determine if there was progress toward equity.  In 1973, a new general state 
aid formula referred to as the “resource equalizer” replaced the former foundation 
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formula as the main funding formula.  This new formula was an alternative way 
(to the foundation formula) to equalize local property tax revenue with general 
state aid revenue across districts in the state.  It not only included a reward for 
effort component, as part of the guaranteed tax base, but included a property tax 
rollback component.  Hickrod and Hubbard (1977) reviewed annual evaluations 
from a 3-year time period to determine progress toward the equity goals.  
Hickrod, Chaudhari, and Lundeen (1980) compared two points in time to 
determine progress toward the equity goals.  Two equity goals that were 
common to both studies were wealth neutrality (also known as fiscal neutrality or 
equal opportunity) and permissible variance in expenditure per pupil.  According 
to Berne and Stiefel (1984), “the wealth neutrality concept states that education 
should not be a function of local wealth” (p. 17).  The first state goal was to 
minimize the relationship between district expenditures and local district wealth to 
an acceptable level.  The second state equity goal was to decrease the variation 
in expenditure per pupil to an acceptable level.  
Findings from both studies indicated that the state had made progress 
toward the stated equity goals during the time period reviewed.  However, they 
both indicated that the elementary school districts did not progress as well as 
high school or unit districts.  There was consensus that a major problem with 
Illinois school funding systems was that there are three distinct types of districts:  
elementary, high school, and unit.  Multiple district types cause problems for the 
state in the distribution of the funding and also in the analysis of the data.  It also 
makes it very complex to try to compare Illinois data to other states, because the 
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majority of them are organized as unit school districts. 
Although Hickrod and Hubbard (1977) did not compare their analysis of 
Illinois to other states, they noted that, because of the Illinois specific funding 
formula and unique district type organization, it is very difficult to do any 
comparisons.  However Hickrod, Chaudhari and Lundeen (1980) did make 
comparisons to Indiana and Iowa in their study.  They specified many differences 
such as the definition of expenditures, pupil count, and time span for data, but 
indicated they could make some “rough comparisons” (p. 17).  The resulting 
comparison consisted of whether Illinois made greater strides toward the equity 
goals than the other two states. 
Three objectives of the study by Hickrod, Chaudhari, and Hubbard (1985) 
were to detail the revisions to the 1973 reform, specify the evaluation, and 
analyze equity over a 14-year period.  Equity was defined as equal educational 
opportunity and was measured using the McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, 
wealth-weighted Gini Index, and linear least squares regression.  A major differ-
ence of this study is the time period of the analysis.  This study encompassed 14 
years, while the other studies only utilized 1 to 3 years of data.  For this section, 
the interest is on the equity analysis of the study.  Although the results varied by 
school district type, there were some interesting findings.  The coefficient of 
variation showed improved equity for 4 years for elementary and unit school 
districts and 5 years for high school districts and then began to become less 
equitable.  Elementary school districts had lost all of their equity gain by the end 
of the 14-year period.  However, high school and unit school districts retained 
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some of their gains.  The results were similar for the McLoone Index with two 
differences.  First, the McLoone Indices seemed to be more erratic across school 
district types than the coefficient of variation.  Second, all school district types 
ended up the time period with gains in equity.  It appears that at least some of 
the equity gained under the new formula was lost during the time of the revisions 
to the formula from 1976 to 1980.  A modified Gini Index utilizing a weighting for 
district wealth and a regression approach (weighted and unweighted) was used 
to measure wealth neutrality in the funding system.  There were very similar 
results for the wealth neutrality measures.  The equity improved for all school 
district types followed by a decline in equity.  It seemed that elementary school 
districts had lost all of their gain by the end of the 14-year period for both the Gini 
and regression approaches, but unit and high school districts retained some of 
their gains.  For the most part, unit school districts had the most equity in the 
funding system, elementary school districts were second, and high school 
districts had the least equity.  Although next steps were not really specified, there 
were some interesting discussion points.  First is that improved equity requires 
continued state funding.  When the state funding decreases, it seems that the 
equity in the system declines.  Second is that to pass “reform” legislation 
components have to be added to the formula.  These additions cost money but 
do not necessarily improve equity.  Finally, when thinking about equity goals 
“Equity attainment depends not only upon the actions of a state legislature, but 
also upon what is simultaneously happening at the local base” (Hickrod et al., 
1985, p. 5).               
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The purpose of the study conducted by Verstegen and Driscoll (2008) was 
to measure equity in the Illinois funding system.  They analyzed data collected for 
the single year 2005.  The formula being analyzed had been in existence since 
Fiscal Year 1999.  Therefore, the impetus for this analysis was not to evaluate 
funding reform (as in the first articles reviewed) but rather to conduct an equity 
analysis at a point in time.  Verstegen and Driscoll (2008) included all state 
revenue (except transportation reimbursement) along with the local property tax 
revenue in their analysis.  They also assumed student weightings for special 
education, limited-English fluency education, and poverty.  The weightings used 
in their analyses were cited from the literature.  It was unclear from the report 
how they determined the count of special education or non-English fluent 
students by school district and whether they assigned the same weighting across 
all special education students.  The equity measures were calculated within the 
three district types but also across all district types. 
The main findings were that the Illinois funding system had wide 
disparities within each district type and was not wealth neutral.  The same 
findings applied to the calculations across all district types.  Verstegen and 
Driscoll (2008) concluded that the State of Illinois needed to provide a majority of 
the funding to school districts and reduce the reliance on local property tax. 
Mullin and Brown (2009) attempted to replicate the Verstegen and Driscoll 
(2008) study.  Although the same equity measures were analyzed, Mullin and 
Brown (2009) concluded that the equity indices were worse than the original 
study indicated.  They indicated that the difference in findings was partly due to 
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Verstegen and Driscoll (2008) not fully describing the source of the variables 
used in their study.  The variables in question were counts of special education 
students, counts of poverty students, district size, and equalized assessed valua-
tions.  It seems that a difference in methodology between the two studies also 
added to the inconsistent findings.  Mullin and Brown (2009) chose not to include 
categorical funding as part of the state revenue in their analysis.  Also, they 
decided to use the school district as the unit of analysis rather than the student. 
Recommendations made by Mullin and Brown (2009) included addressing 
special interest populations, analyzing both adjusted and unadjusted data, and 
preparing a comprehensive state report.  Most of these recommendations 
stemmed from a difference in opinion as to whether categorical funding and 
special population adjustments should be included in the equity measures or not. 
Verstegen and Driscoll (2009) responded to the criticisms included in the 
replication study by Mullin and Brown (2009).  They reviewed their original study 
and compared it to the Mullin and Brown (2009) replication study.  They indicated 
that the study (Mullin & Brown, 2009) was flawed due to the following reasons: 
1. The school district was the unit of analysis. 
 
2. It used only the General State Aid formula revenue and none of the 
state categorical revenue. 
 
3. It did not include an analysis of the vertical equity principle. 
 
4. The poverty grant revenue was included but did not weight or adjust for 
the count of poverty students. 
 
5. The analysis used an outdated equalized assessed valuation. 
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Verstegen and Driscoll (2009) reiterated their original findings that the Illinois 
funding system is inequitable and is not wealth neutral (does not provide equal 
opportunities for all students). 
Hickrod and Hubbard (1977) and Hickrod, Chaudhari and Lundeen (1980) 
compared indices between two points in time to evaluate a new funding formula.  
However, Verstegen and Driscoll (2008, 2009) and Mullin and Brown (2008) only 
analyzed one year of data, so there was no comparison.  Hickrod, Chaudhari, 
and Hubbard (1985) expanded the Hickrod and Hubbard study (1977) to analyze 
14 years of data to investigate patterns.  Another difference in the studies 
pertained to categorical funding.  Verstegen and Driscoll (2008, 2009) proposed 
the inclusion of all state funding, including categorical funding, in an equity study.  
Their belief is that the equity results would be skewed if the categorical funding 
was eliminated from the analysis.  However, Hickrod and Hubbard (1977) had a 
different viewpoint on whether to include categorical funding in the equity 
analysis: 
In essence then, we have assumed that state general equity goals must 
be achieved before “targeted” money is laid on, since “targeted” money 
is intended for special needs after general equity has been achieved.  
We have therefore taken the same policy position relative to state 
categoricals that the federal officials generally take relative to federal 
categoricals.  Equity, or in the federal terms “parity,” must be achieved 
first with general state aid and local dollars before categorical dollars are 
allowed to enter the calculations.  (p. 23) 
 
Studies Analyzing a New Equity Measure/Funding  
System in Illinois 
Hinrichs (1982), Dahncke (1990), and Smith (1994) studied school funding 
equity in Illinois by creating hypothetical situations.  In the case of Hinrichs 
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(1982), pseudo-unit districts were created in the state by combining the dual 
elementary and high school districts.  Once the pseudo-unit districts were 
created, the equity criteria (wealth neutrality, conditional wealth neutrality, and 
permissible variance) were measured using the Gini Index, regression, McLoone 
Index, and coefficient of variation.  The state made progress toward equity in 
comparing 1974 to 1977 but reversed when comparing 1977 to 1982.  A future 
step suggested in the study was to expand the study to include additional years 
(1976, 1978, and 1980) to see possible patterns in the measures of equity.  
According to Hinrichs (1982): “If equity in school finance is a desirable goal in the 
state of Illinois for the school population, the General Assembly should consider 
any district organization which would positively affect the degree of equity” (p. 
128).  At the time of this study, not only did the creation of pseudo-unit districts 
improve equity but also decreased the number of school districts by 40% (1,000 
districts down to 600).   
Dahncke (1990) simulated a general state aid formula that was proposed 
by the Illinois State Board of Education in 1985.  The purpose of the study was to 
compare the equity indices of the simulated formula to the equity measures of 
the actual formula.  The first step was to simulate the three-tier formula.  All 
school districts would receive funding through a flat grant in the first tier.  School 
districts that had local revenues per pupil less than the foundation level would 
receive funding through the foundation formula in tier two.  Finally, the third tier 
was a reward for effort formula that would provide additional funds for school 
districts that have tax rate higher than the permissive rate.  The second step was 
  
48 
 
to calculate the equity measures for the simulated formula and actual formula.  
Dahncke (1990) used fiscal year 1989 funding data for 34 selected school 
districts.  The McLoone Index was utilized to measure horizontal equity and the 
Gini Index was utilized to measure equal opportunity (wealth neutrality).  The 
findings indicated that the simulated formula was not more equitable than the 
actual formula.  High school districts had the higher (more equitable) McLoone 
Index, followed by unit school districts.  Unit school districts had the lower (more 
equitable) Gini Index, followed by high school districts.  Elementary school 
districts fared worse for both of the equity measures.  Weaknesses of the study 
included not using a random sample for selecting the school districts and 
analyzing a single year of data.  Next steps were to replicate the study to include 
all school districts in the state, expand the number of years analyzed, utilize 
additional equity measures, include categorical funding, and analyze adequacy of 
the funding formulas.            
Smith (1994) was interested in redistributing the commercial and industrial 
equalized assessed valuation (EAV) across the state.  The EAV was subtracted 
from the individual school districts and redistributed based upon average daily 
attendance.  This study only measured the horizontal equity of the EAV 
redistribution using the Federal Range Ratio and coefficient of variation.  Smith 
(1994) did not include an equity analysis of the state funding formula and was not 
interested in the equity goal of equal opportunity (wealth neutrality).  Major 
weaknesses of the study were that the equity measures were calculated 
statewide rather than by school district type and district size was not taken into 
  
49 
 
consideration.  Also, Smith (1994) only investigated EAV data from 1988, so it 
was not possible to make conclusions about trends. 
Lows (1985) investigated the three school district types in Illinois and 
devised a procedure to analyze across them rather than having to measure 
equity within each district type.  Most previous equity studies conducted in Illinois 
had included equity measured within each district type.  This was a problem 
because it was difficult to report how the state as a whole was progressing 
toward equity goals.  Lows used the Gini coefficient and analyzed data at two 
points in time (1981 and 1984).  The funding formula for those two points in time 
was similar to the current formula, in that, there were three options.  Option 1 
was basically a foundation level formula, option 2 was an alternate formula, and 
option 3 was a flat grant.  The amount of local revenue for a school district 
determined which option applied.   
Lows (1985) used complex formulas to calculate the Gini coefficients.  
Five levels of inequality were defined for the study.  The first level calculated the 
amount of inequality associated with option 1 of the funding formula.  The second 
level added into the equation option 2 of the funding formula and depicted the 
amount of inequality associated with option 2.  Option 3 of the funding formula 
was added into the third level.  The fourth level included the inequality by adding 
in the corporate personal property replacement tax revenue.  Finally, the fifth 
level added in the local taxing leeway (either having tax rates above or below the 
statutory rate used in the formula) of school districts.  Next, seven combinations 
of school district type were created.  These consisted of elementary; secondary; 
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unit; elementary and secondary; elementary and unit; secondary and unit; and 
elementary, secondary and unit.  The final computations calculated the inequality 
of each level by each of the categories of district type.  Each level was added to 
the equation one at a time to parcel out the amount of inequity it added to the 
total amount of inequity. 
The findings indicated three major concerns.  First, elementary districts in 
Illinois had the most inequity under option 1 (equalization) of the formula.  
Second, when considering the local leeway in local taxation, secondary districts 
fared less well.  Third, all district types were less equitable in 1984 than they 
were in 1981.  In summary, the author suggests that legislators need to either 
improve equity across all district types or mandate unit school districts.  
According to Lows (1985), “Simply put, the quality of a child’s education should 
not be a function of the type of school district in which the child resides” (p. 55). 
It was unclear in the description of the study how revenues were used 
when combining school district types.  For example, when combining elementary 
and unit districts for analysis, were all the revenues used in the unit district even 
though some were for high school students?  Once again only two points in time 
were analyzed, which did not allow for trend data.  It was also unclear why those 
specific years were chosen for the study. 
The studies in this category clearly indicated problems with funding equity 
in Illinois and that some part of that inequity was due to differences in the 
organization of school districts.  Hinrichs (1982) and Lows (1985) both 
investigated the effect of district type on equity.  Hinrichs (1982) created pseudo-
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unit districts for analysis and Lows (1985) conducted a computational analysis to 
show the inequities.  Smith (1995) seemed to ignore the school district 
organization and calculated equity indices across the state.  Dahncke (1990) 
analyzed across school district types, but was not interested in specifying how 
equitable the funding system was but rather compared the equity indices of the 
funding system to a simulated funding system.  Also, because Dahncke (1990) 
only analyzed a single year, there was no comparison over time.                 
Comparison Studies of Illinois Funding to Other States 
It was discussed earlier that comparison of equity studies across states is 
extremely difficult for all sorts of reasons.  Yet, it was the purpose of the study by 
Hirth (1994) to analyze horizontal equity trends in Indiana and then make 
comparisons to Illinois and Michigan.  The majority of the study consisted of 
background information on the school funding structure in Indiana, and the equity 
study conducted utilizing Indiana data from 1982 through 1992.  There were 
short summaries of Illinois and Michigan, and finally a summary of findings. 
In summarizing data for Illinois, Hirth (1994) used studies produced by the 
Center for the Study of Educational Finance at Illinois State University from 1973 
to 1988.  Once again. the school district organization in Illinois complicated the 
equity discussion.  The studies reviewed indicated that there had been progress 
in increased funding equity until the last couple of years when equity worsened.  
“The researchers conclude that Illinois is not equitably funded with regard to K-12 
education and that the situation relative to equity is growing progressively worse” 
(p. 185).  The worsening of equity was attributed to changes in the formula and a 
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lack of state revenues to dedicate to the funding formula.  Also, this study 
included a short summary of the Illinois funding lawsuit in November 1990 that 
was dismissed on grounds that it was the responsibility of the legislature to 
finance education in the state.  Finally, there was a comment regarding the 
School Finance Task Force that made recommendations to the General 
Assembly in 1993 regarding such things as adequacy, regional cost adjustment 
equity, property tax structure, and relief.  It is interesting that these same 
categories of recommendations were also made by the Illinois Education Funding 
Advisory Board (EFAB) just a few years later in 2002.  Illinois’ school funding 
problems continue to exist. 
Many cautions were cited in the study regarding comparisons across 
states.  Some of these were differences in the funding formulas, categories of 
revenues and expenditures, and different time series of analysis.  With all of 
these cautions, it was unclear why the author chose to make comparisons to 
Illinois and Michigan. 
Hickrod, Chaudhari, and Lundeen (1980) compared progress in equity 
goals for Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa.  The hypothesis for the study was: 
The reforms of the 1970’s succeeded most in reducing the disparities in 
property tax burdens between school districts, succeeded less well in 
increasing wealth or fiscal neutrality, and succeeded least well in 
reducing disparities between districts in expenditures per pupil. (p. 3) 
 
The equity analysis consisted of two points in time beginning with 1973 for all 
states but a varying ending year (1977 for Indiana, 1978 for Iowa, and 1979 for 
Illinois.  A major problem in comparing across these states is that Illinois contains 
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three types of school districts (unit, elementary and high school), but Indiana and 
Iowa are organized as unit school districts.  Equity goals analyzed included 
disparity in expenditure per pupil and unconditional wealth neutrality.  All of the 
states had the greatest amount of improvement with the unconditional wealth 
neutrality.  Indiana had the least amount of improvement, and Illinois elementary 
school districts showed little progress on any of the equity measures.  In Illinois, 
unit school districts had the most progress toward wealth neutrality but actually 
lost ground on disparity in district expenditures.  The erratic results between the 
equity goals and across states led to a summation that “Fiscal policies designed 
to reduce expenditure disparity may or may not contribute to wealth neutrality”  
(p. 29). 
In 1973, Illinois, Kansas, and Michigan changed their school funding 
formulas from foundation programs to power equalizing programs.  Yang (1975) 
analyzed the effect on equity of the funding reforms in these three states.  The 
study utilized 3 years of data, which included the year before the funding reform 
and the first 2 years of the reform.  The equity measures used were the 
coefficient of variation, McLoone Index, Gini Index, and simple regression 
coefficient.  The analysis was complicated because Illinois has three types of 
school districts (elementary, high school, and unit), but Michigan and Kansas are 
organized as unit school districts.  Also, Kansas school districts were analyzed 
by three size categories (less than 400 students, 400 to 1,299 students, and 
greater than 1,299 students), because the funding reform contained adjustments 
for school district size.  All groups had progress toward equity as measured by 
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the coefficient of variation.  The only note was that Illinois elementary school 
districts and Kansas small school districts had higher equity gains in the first year 
of the reform compared to the second year.  The results of the McLoone Index 
were not as positive.  Illinois elementary school districts, Michigan school 
districts, and Kansas small school districts were less equitable both years of the 
funding reform.  The other groups analyzed (Illinois unit and high school districts 
and Kansas medium and large school districts) were more equitable.  All of the 
groups had increased equity as measured by the Gini Index and the simple 
regression coefficient.  Kansas small school districts had a smaller equity 
increase in the second year of the funding reform, while all other groups had 
more equity in the second year compared to the first year.                 
Need For and Significance of the Present Study 
Many equity studies have been conducted based on data from the Illinois 
funding system.  Inequity in school funding is the major theme of these studies.  
Some of these studies investigated certain points in time and specific funding 
formulas in place, while other studies simulated changes to the funding structure 
in the state.  None of these studies examined the impact that specific 
adjustments made to the General State Aid formula had on equity.  Also, most of 
the studies reviewed examined either two points in time or a single point in time 
for analysis.  An exception was the Hickrod, Chaudhari, and Hubbard study 
(1985) that analyzed the Resource Equalizer formula that was adopted in 1973 
for 14 years (1973 to 1986).  The Property Tax Extension Limitation Law and 
Hold Harmless adjustments were analyzed for 12 years (2000 through 2011) to 
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determine the trend of equity (or inequity) that had occurred.  This study filled two 
important gaps in the literature.  The first gap was that there had not been any 
equity studies on school funding in Illinois that analyze several years of data for 
the foundation formula that was adopted in 1999.  This is critical information to 
determine if a funding system meets the equity goals of the state.  The second 
gap was that there had not been any equity studies on school funding in Illinois 
regarding adjustments made to the General State Aid formula.  Two critical 
legislative provisions have been added to the General State Aid formula that 
have required funding of $5.54 billion over a 12-year period, but no study had 
been conducted to analyze the effect they have had on the equity goals of the 
state.  This study filled both of these gaps in the research, informed 
policymakers, and provided a basis for future research on Illinois school funding. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
One reason for utilizing an equalization formula is to eliminate or at least 
decrease the disparity in per pupil funding; therefore, it is important to understand 
how various adjustments to the GSA formula affect equity in the funding system.  
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact that the Property Tax 
Extension Limitation Law (PTELL) adjustment and the GSA Hold Harmless 
component had on equity in the Illinois funding system.  Because the State of 
Illinois has three types of school districts with different taxing authority and tax 
bases, the analyses were completed within district type and not the state as a 
whole.  This chapter will specify the methodology and statistical procedures to 
address the five major research questions.  
Research Questions and Statistical Methods 
Research Question 1 
What were the equity indices in the Illinois GSA funding system from 
Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2011 as computed by the four 
standard equity measures: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, simple 
regression coefficient, and multiple regression change in the coefficient of 
determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and differences in the 
results? 
   
This research question was answered by computing the specified equity 
indices by district type for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2011.  The simple 
regression model used the unrestricted revenue per pupil as the dependent 
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variable and the equalized assessed valuation per pupil as the independent 
variable.  The multiple regression model added the operating tax rate as another 
independent variable.  The results of the equity indices were used as a baseline 
for comparison of the measurements calculated in the following three research 
questions. 
Research Question 2 
When eliminating the PTELL adjustment in the Illinois GSA formula and 
holding the entitlement constant by increasing the foundation level, what 
are the equity indices in the GSA funding system from Fiscal Year 2000 
through Fiscal Year 2011 as computed by the four standard equity 
measures: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, simple regression 
coefficient, and multiple regression change in the coefficient of 
determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and differences in the 
results?  
  
This research question was answered by calculating the associated cost 
of the PTELL adjustment, eliminating the adjustment in the GSA formula, 
increasing the foundation level to utilize the associated cost of the PTELL 
adjustment and recalculating the GSA formula.  These steps were completed for 
Fiscal Years 2000 through 2011.  The specified equity indices were calculated.  
Again the simple regression model used the unrestricted revenue per pupil as the 
dependent variable and the equalized assessed valuation per pupil as the 
independent variable.  The multiple regression model added the operating tax 
rate as another independent variable. 
Research Question 3 
When eliminating the Hold Harmless component in the Illinois GSA 
formula and holding the entitlement constant by increasing the foundation 
level, what are the equity indices in the GSA funding system from Fiscal 
Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2010 as computed by the four standard 
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equity measures: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, simple 
regression coefficient, and multiple regression change in the coefficient of 
determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and differences in the 
results?  
  
This research question was answered by calculating the associated cost 
of the Hold Harmless component, eliminating it in the GSA formula, increasing 
the foundation level to utilize the associated cost savings and recalculating the 
GSA formula by school district.  These steps were completed for Fiscal Years 
2000 through 2010 (the Hold Harmless component was eliminated in Fiscal Year 
2011).  The specified equity indices were calculated.  Again the simple 
regression model used the unrestricted revenue per pupil as the dependent 
variable and the equalized assessed valuation per pupil as the independent 
variable.  The multiple regression model added the operating tax rate as another 
independent variable. 
Research Question 4 
When eliminating the PTELL adjustment and Hold Harmless component in 
the Illinois GSA formula and holding the entitlement constant by increasing 
the foundation level, what are the equity indices in the GSA funding 
system from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2010 as computed by 
the four standard equity indices: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, 
simple regression coefficient, and multiple regression change in the 
coefficient of determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and differences 
in the results? 
   
This research question was answered by eliminating the PTELL 
adjustment and Hold Harmless component in the GSA formula; increasing the 
foundation level to utilize the associated cost savings of these two formula 
components; and recalculating the GSA formula.  These steps were completed 
for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2010.  The specified equity indices were 
  
59 
 
calculated.  Again, the simple regression model used the unrestricted revenue 
per pupil as the dependent variable and the equalized assessed valuation per 
pupil as the independent variable.  The multiple regression model added the 
operating tax rate as another independent variable. 
Research Question 5 
What are the similarities and differences in the equity indices between and 
across the different simulations?  
  
This research question was answered by analyzing the results across the 
first four research questions to determine the similarities and differences by 
school district type and equity measure. 
Population and Sources of Data 
The population used in this study consisted of Illinois public school 
districts from Fiscal Years 2000 (n=896) through 2011 (n=868).  The equity 
measures were calculated for the school districts in existence each year.  No 
attempt was made to account for consolidation or annexation of school districts 
over the time period. 
The Illinois Department of Revenue (IDoR) is responsible for the collection 
and verification of the corporate personal property replacement taxes, equalized 
assessed valuations (EAV) and tax rates for the school districts in the state.  The 
IDoR transfers the certified data to the Illinois State Board of Education for use in 
the General State Aid formula. 
Average daily attendance (ADA), corporate personal property replacement 
taxes (CPPRT), equalized assessed valuations, General State Aid entitlements, 
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General State Aid Hold Harmless payments, limiting rates, poverty counts and 
tax rates were obtained from the Illinois State Board of Education.  School district 
demographic data needed were district ID, district name, district type, county and 
PTELL status.  The data files obtained from the Illinois State Board of Education 
are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Data Files Obtained from the Illinois State Board of Education 
 
 
File Name 
 
Years 
 
Variables 
 
AVTRyy.XLS 
 
1996 through 2009 
 
District ID, EAV and Operating Tax 
Rate 
 
DISTRICT_SUMyy.XLS 
 
2000 through 2011 
 
District ID, district name, county and 
district type  
 
GSAVARyy.XLS 
 
2000 through 2011 
 
District ID, ADA, CPPRT, EAV 
adjustments, GSA Entitlements, 
Hold Harmless payments, poverty 
counts 
 
PTELLyy.XLS 
 
1997 through 2009 
 
District ID and limiting rate 
 
Summary 
This study involved five major steps to address the research questions.  In 
the first step, the GSA formula was calculated (as it was calculated and 
distributed to school districts), and then the equity indices were determined for 
each of the Fiscal Years from 2000 through 2011.  This first step provided the 
baseline data for comparison purposes.  In step two, the PTELL adjustment in 
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the GSA formula was eliminated and while holding the entitlement constant the 
foundation level was increased for each of the Fiscal Years 2000 through 2011.  
The specified equity indices were calculated.  Step three eliminated the Hold 
Harmless component of the GSA formula and while holding the entitlement 
constant the foundation level was increased for each of the Fiscal Years 2000 
through 2010.  The specified equity indices were calculated.  Step four combined 
the elimination of both the PTELL adjustment and the Hold Harmless component.  
The entitlement amount was held constant and the foundation level was 
increased for each of the Fiscal Years 2000 through 2010.  Once again, the 
specified equity indices were calculated.  Finally, in step five, all of the equity 
indices were compared, within school district type, to determine how the two 
major adjustments to the GSA formula (PTELL adjustment and Hold Harmless) 
affected equity in the Illinois funding system. 
Chapter IV presents the findings and analysis regarding the five research 
questions.  Chapter V summarizes the study and the findings and discusses the 
implications for education policy makers. 
 
 62 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
This chapter reviews the design of the study and describes the findings of 
the data analyses.   
Review of the Study 
The focus of the study was to assess horizontal equity and equal 
opportunity (wealth neutrality) in Illinois school funding.  The components of the 
Illinois funding system, utilized in this study, included General State Aid (GSA), 
GSA Hold Harmless, corporate personal property replacement tax (CPPRT), and 
local property tax revenue.  This study consisted of four scenarios that measure 
equity in the Illinois funding system.  The first two scenarios were conducted over 
a 12-year period (2000–2011), while the last two scenarios were conducted over 
an 11-year period, because the GSA Hold Harmless was eliminated in 2011.  
The measures used to analyze horizontal equity were the McLoone Index and 
coefficient of variation.  A simple regression, as measured by the simple 
regression coefficient, was used to analyze wealth neutrality.  A multiple 
regression, as measured by a change in coefficient of determination (R2) was 
used to analyze conditional wealth neutrality. 
In the first scenario, baseline measurements of equity in the Illinois 
funding system were calculated. These baseline indices were used as  
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comparisons in the other three scenarios. 
The second scenario included a simulation concerning the Property Tax 
Extension Limitation Law (PTELL) adjustment in the GSA Formula.  The PTELL 
adjustment was eliminated and the associated savings was used to increase the 
GSA foundation level.  The equity measures were calculated to determine the 
effect that the PTELL adjustment had on the equity in the Illinois funding system.  
The simulated indices were compared to the baseline equity indices from the first 
scenario. 
The third scenario involved a simulation regarding the Hold Harmless 
component of the GSA Formula.  The GSA Hold Harmless component was 
eliminated and the associated savings was used to increase the GSA foundation 
level.  The equity measures were calculated to determine the effect that the GSA 
Hold Harmless component had on equity in the Illinois funding system.  Once 
again, the simulated equity indices were compared to the baseline indices from 
the first scenario. 
The final scenario involved a simulation that combined the prior two 
simulations.  The PTELL adjustment and GSA Hold Harmless were both 
eliminated and the combined associated savings was used to increase the GSA 
foundation level.  The simulated equity measures were calculated and compared 
to the baseline equity indices to determine the effect of scenario four on equity in 
the Illinois funding system. 
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Findings 
Background Data 
As seen in Table 2, Illinois school districts experienced changes between 
2000 and 2011.  The number of school districts decreased from 896 in 2000 to 
867 in 2011, a 3.2% change.  The largest decrease occurred in unit school 
districts at 5%. Over the time period the percentage of school districts by type 
remained fairly constant at 43% elementary districts, 12% high school districts, 
and 45% unit districts.   
During this time, the GSA foundation level increased 9 of the 11 years with 
only the 2003 and 2011 years remaining flat.  The largest increase of $400 
(7.5%) was in 2008.  The GSA foundation level ranged from $4,325 in 2000 up to 
$6,119 in 2011, a 41% increase over the time period.  In addition, the GSA 
appropriation also increased 9 of the 11 years with the only decrease occurring in 
2003 and a flat appropriation in 2011.  The largest percentage increase in the 
GSA appropriation occurred in 2004 at 9.7% but the largest dollar amount 
increase ($308,381,800) occurred in 2008.  The GSA appropriation increased 
54% from 2000 to 2011. 
As seen in Tables 3 through 5, the percentage of school districts statewide 
that were subject to PTELL increased from 41.2% in 2000 to 53.1% in 2011 (an 
increase of 91 school districts).  The statewide associated cost of the PTELL 
adjustment ranged from $46 million in 2000 to $793 million in 2010 and then 
decreased in 2011 to $638 million (a total of $5.14 billion).  
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Table 2 
 
Statewide School Funding Data 2000-2011 
 
            Number of School Districts  
Elementary High School Unit Total 
 
    GSA Foundation Level        
  Amount    Change 
    $ % 
                      GSA Appropriation   
 Amount       Change 
    $      % 
2000 384 103 409 896 $4,325 NA NA $2,982,563,600 NA NA 
2001 383 103 408 894 $4,425 $100 2.31% $2,994,715,000 $12,151,400 0.41% 
2002 383 103 407 893 $4,560 $135 3.05% $3,231,727,600 $237,012,600 7.91% 
2003 383 103 407 893 $4,560 $0 0.00% $3,142,100,000 -$89,627,600 -2.77% 
2004 381 103 404 888 $4,810 $250 5.48% $3,445,600,000 $303,500,000 9.66% 
2005 379 103 399 881 $4,964 $154 3.20% $3,682,201,200 $236,601,200 6.87% 
2006 377 102 395 874 $5,164 $200 4.03% $3,903,969,600 $221,768,400 6.02% 
2007 376 102 395 873 $5,334 $170 3.29% $4,146,118,200 $242,148,600 6.20% 
2008 378 102 390 870 $5,734 $400 7.50% $4,454,500,000 $308,381,800 7.44% 
2009 378 101 390 869 $5,959 $225 3.92% $4,581.561,600 $127,061,600 2.85% 
2010 378 101 389 868 $6,119 $160 2.69% $4,600,305,100 $18,743,500 0.41% 
2011 378 101 388 867 $6,119 $0 0.00% $4,600,305,100 $0 0.00% 
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During the 11-year period, the GSA Hold Harmless component generated 
a total of $403.7 million.  Over the time period, elementary school districts 
accounted for 31%, high school districts had 25% and unit school districts at 
44%.  The yearly amount ranged from $19.6 million in 2007 up to $65.8 million in 
2001.  The number of eligible districts ranged from 80 in 2008 up to 315 in 2001.   
For elementary school districts (See Table 3), the number of elementary 
school districts subject to the PTELL adjustment increased by 17.1% in 2011 
compared to 2000 from 228 to 267 districts.  Also, during the 12-year time period 
the percentage of elementary school districts subject to PTELL ranged from 59% 
to 71%.  On average, elementary school districts accounted for 59% of the total 
school districts subject to PTELL.  Also, elementary school districts accounted for 
13.5% of the total associated cost of the PTELL adjustment with the amount 
ranging from $804,409 up to $132 million (2010).   
The GSA Hold Harmless component for elementary school districts 
ranged from $6.1 million (61 districts) in 2002 up to $19.9 million (54 districts) in 
2010.  Elementary school districts accounted for $124.2 million of the total 
$403.7 million of the component. 
When comparing the amount of local revenue received by elementary 
school districts to the prior year, the percentage change ranged from 4.3% 
(2002) to 7.6% (2008).  The percentage change in state revenue was more 
erratic with a decrease of 2.5% in 2003 and the largest increase of 11% in 2004. 
 Table 4 contained data regarding high school districts.  The number of 
high school districts subject to the PTELL adjustment increased by 15.8% from 
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57 to 66 districts in 2011 compared to 2000.  Also, during the 12-year time period 
the percentage of high school districts subject to PTELL ranged from 55% to 
66%.  On average, high school districts accounted for 14% of the total school 
districts subject to PTELL.  High school districts accounted for only 6.7% of the 
total associated cost of the PTELL adjustment with the amount ranging from 
$169,876 up to $67.5 million (2010). 
The GSA Hold Harmless component for high school districts ranged from 
$1.1 million (10 districts) in 2007 up to $24.4 million (73 districts) in 2001.  High 
school districts accounted for $101.9 million of the total $403.7 million of the 
component. 
 When comparing the amount of local revenue received by high school 
districts to the prior year, the percentage change ranged from 3.5% (2002) to 
7.2% (2008).  The percentage change in state revenue was more erratic with a 
decrease of 3.7% in 2003 and the largest increase of 17.7% in 2004. 
Unit school districts accounted for an average of 27% of the total school 
districts subject to PTELL (See Table 5.).  The number of unit school districts 
subject to the PTELL adjustment increased by 51.2% in 2011 compared to 2000 
from 84 to 127 districts.  Also, during the 12-year time period the percentage of 
unit school districts subject to PTELL ranged from 21% to 33%.  Unit school 
districts accounted for 79.8% of the total associated cost of the PTELL 
adjustment with the amount ranging from $45 million up to $612 million (2009).   
The GSA Hold Harmless component for unit school districts ranged from 
$7.8 million (29 districts) in 2008 up to $34.7 million (127 districts) in 2003.  Unit 
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school districts accounted for $177.6 million of the total $403.7 million of the 
component. 
When comparing the amount of local revenue received by unit school 
districts to the prior year, the percentage change ranged from 3.6% (2011) to 
8.0% (2008).  The percentage change in state revenue was more erratic with a 
decrease of 3.5% in 2003 and the largest increase of 8.7% in 2004. 
Chicago School District 299 is a unit school district that accounts for 
approximately 18% of students statewide (as measured by average daily 
attendance).  Because Chicago School District 299 is the largest in the state, it is 
important to note how the school district impacted the PTELL adjustment and 
GSA Hold Harmless.  Of the total $5.14 billion associated cost of the PTELL 
adjustment, Chicago School District 299 accounted for 66% ($3.4 billion).  The 
annual amount and percentage of the PTELL adjustment associated with 
Chicago School District 299 fluctuated throughout the time period, the amount 
ranged from $34 million to $524 million (54.2% to 89.3%).  However Chicago 
School District 299 did not account for any of the GSA Hold Harmless 
component.      
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Table 3 
School Funding Data for Elementary School Districts, 2000-2011 
   
  
                     Subject to PTELL                 Subject to Hold Harmless                  Change in Revenue 
Year # Districts % Districts Cost    # Districts   % Districts          Cost     Local %   State % 
2000 228 59.38  $ 804,409 104 27.08 $7,906,041  NA NA 
2001 228 59.53 $3,861,569 116 30.29 $11,355,828  4.58 2.16 
2002 263 68.67 $20,120,395 61 15.93 $6,122,817  4.31 9.39 
2003 269 70.23 $10,232,208 86 22.45 $11,820,412  5.44 -2.49 
2004 269 70.60 $14,798,233 53 13.91 $8,488,565  5.43 10.96 
2005 268 70.71 $60,369,206 52 13.72 $9,354,291  5.73 6.28 
2006 267 70.82 $60,424,001 43 11.41 $8,864,128  7.14 5.33 
2007 267 71.01 $61,952,448 48 12.77 $9,691,487  6.14 5.58 
2008 267 70.63 $95,934,579 45 11.90 $14,537,668  7.56 7.25 
2009 267 70.63 $114,898,089 47 12.43 $16,155,041  7.41 2.73 
2010 
2011 
267 
267 
70.63 
70.63 
$132,042,747 
$116,725,770 
54 
NA 
14.29 
          NA 
$19,933,128 
NA 
 
5.70 
4.99 
2.44 
1.93 
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Table 4 
 
School Funding Data for High School Districts, 2000-2011 
 
        Subject to PTELL            Subject to Hold Harmless      Change in Revenue 
Year  # Districts % Districts Cost  # Districts % Districts Cost     Local %     State % 
 
2000 57 55.34 $169,876 76 73.79 $23,825,795 NA NA 
 
2001 57 55.34 $1,156,497 73 70.87 $24,397,426 4.17 1.92 
 
2002 65 63.11 $8,936,802 54 52.43 $13,440,100 3.51 13.38 
 
2003 67 65.05 $3,772,141 59 57.28 $17,682,367 5.04 -3.66 
 
2004 67 65.05 $4,735,758 36 34.95 $9,455,270 5.01 17.66 
 
2005 67 65.05 $25,512,581 25 24.27 $4,882,673 5.67 11.53 
 
2006 67 65.69 $29,818,353 14 13.73 $2,494,994 5.33 12.59 
 
2007 67 65.69 $32,110,605 10 9.80 $1,082,686 5.52 9.35 
 
2008 67 65.69 $52,991,034 6 5.88 $1,118,042 7.24 11.40 
 
2009 66 65.35 $61,674,761 7 6.93 $1,140,753 6.36 4.08 
 
2010 66 65.35 $67,498,867 8 7.92 $2,326,266 5.21 0.04 
 
2011 66 65.35 $58,288,420 NA NA NA 4.53 0.82 
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Table 5 
School Funding Data for Unit School Districts, 2000-2011 
 
                        Subject to PTELL                     Subject to Hold Harmless         Change in Revenue       
Year # Districts % Districts Cost # Districts % Districts       Cost   Local %   State % 
2000 84 20.54 $45,023,744 81 19.80 $16,222,447  NA   NA 
2001 102 25.00 $47,145,527 126 30.88 $30,091,381  4.42   0.17 
2002 108 26.54 $72,479,792 79 19.41 $15,099,211  3.78   7.52 
2003 119 29.24 $185,132,969 127 31.20 $34,655,420  5.38   -3.53 
2004 124 30.69 $185,669,699 80 19.80 $19,049,250  5.94   8.68 
2005 123 30.83 $271,450,024 61 15.29 $12,839,444  3.69   6.65 
2006 125 31.65 $490,365,891 42 10.63 $10,228,806  5.33   5.29 
2007 127 32.15 $530,034,766 37   9.37 $8,820,419  4.71   5.73 
2008 127 32.56 $603,239,993 29   7.44 $7,817,181  7.95   7.07 
2009 127 32.56 $612,449,797 32   8.21 $9,153,431  7.31   3.36 
2010 
127 32.65 $593,124,957 39      10.0 $13,613,882  5.01   0.47 
2011 127 32.73 $463,095,905 NA NA NA  3.59   -1.33 
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Research Question 1 
What were the equity indices in the Illinois GSA funding system from 
Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2011 as computed by the four 
standard equity measures: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, simple 
regression coefficient, and multiple regression change in the coefficient of 
determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and differences in the 
results? 
 
This research question dealt with calculating baseline measurements of 
equity in the Illinois funding system.  The McLoone Index and coefficient of 
variation were used to measure the horizontal equity in the system.  The simple 
regression coefficient and multiple regression change in the coefficient of 
determination were used to measure the equal opportunity of the funding system.  
Tables 6 through 9 contain the computations regarding one of the equity 
measures for the three school district types (elementary, high school, and unit). 
McLoone index.  The formula for calculating the McLoone Index utilizes 
the revenues per pupil for each school district and the median level of revenues 
per pupil by school district type.  The index is a ratio of the sum of revenues per 
pupil for school districts below the median level to the sum if all pupils below the 
median were at the median level.  The closer the ratio is to 1 the more horizontal 
equity is associated with the funding system.  The revenues were defined as the 
sum of General State Aid, corporate personal property replacement tax, and local 
property tax revenue.   
As shown in Table 6, the median levels of revenues per pupil for 
elementary and unit school districts over the 12-year period were very similar.  
Elementary school districts ranged from $4,978 to $8,305 and unit school 
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districts ranged from $4,881 to $7,483.  However, the median levels of revenues 
per pupil for high school districts were quite a bit higher, ranging from $7,051 to 
$10,827. 
Unit school districts had the more equitable indices over the time period 
ranging from .9364 (2011) to .9522 (2000) but only had 2 years (2005 and 2008) 
where the index improved over the prior year.  The McLoone Index for 
elementary school districts ranged from .8807 (2011) to .9164 (2004) but only 
had 3 years (2002, 2004, and 2007) where the index improved over the prior 
year.  Finally high school districts had indices that ranged from .8156 (2005) to 
.8444 (2002), but equity improved over the prior year in 6 years of the time 
period. 
Coefficient of variation.  The purpose of the coefficient of variation is to 
measure the disparity in the revenues per pupil by school district type.  This was 
the second measure used to assess the horizontal equity in the funding system.  
The same definitions for district revenues and student counts were used.  The 
index is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean and 
multiplying by 100.  The closer the index is to zero the more horizontal equity that 
is associated with the funding system. 
As seen in Table 7, the index for elementary school districts ranged from 
28.00 (more equity) in 2002 to 34.86 (less equity) in 2011.  The index improved 
over the previous year in only one year (2002).  High school districts had the best 
equity index in 2006 at 29.91 to the worst equity index of 33.92 in 2000. 
However, high school districts had 6 years where the index improved over the 
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previous year.  Unit school districts had an index that ranged from 13.52 (2005) 
to 17.93 (2011).  Also, there were 3 years (2002, 2004, and 2005) where equity 
improved for unit school districts over the previous year. 
In analyzing the coefficient of variation indices for the 12-year period, the 
funding system was more equitable for unit school districts.  Elementary and high 
school districts had very similar and higher (less equitable) indices than unit 
school districts. 
Simple regression coefficient.  The regression coefficient was used to 
analyze the wealth neutrality of the funding system.  School district revenue per 
pupil was used as the dependent variable and school district wealth (equalized 
assessed valuation per pupil) was used as the independent variable.  The less of 
a relationship between district revenue and wealth (regression coefficient closer 
to zero) the more wealth neutral or more equitable is the funding system.   
In reviewing the indices in Table 8, one can see that unit school districts 
had the lowest (most equitable) indices that ranged from .1289 (2008) to .1509 
(2011).  There were 4 years (2002, 2005, 2007, and 2008) that the equity index 
improved over the previous year.  Elementary school districts were next with 
respect to equity in the funding system.  The indices ranged from .2306 in 2000 
to .2919 in 2011.  There were only 3 years (2002, 2004, and 2007) where the 
index improved over the previous year.  The majority of years the index 
worsened which means that the relationship between revenue and wealth 
strengthened and equity declined.  Although high school districts were third with 
the values of the regression coefficients, the long-term pattern was the reverse of 
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the result of the elementary school districts.  The high school districts began at a 
low equity point of .4539 in 2000 and steadily improved to .3469 in 2010.  There 
was a decline to .3673 in 2011, but there were 9 years where the index improved 
over the prior year. 
Multiple regression.  A multiple regression was used to analyze 
conditional wealth neutrality.  This measure is similar to wealth neutrality, in that, 
it provides a calculation to determine the strength of the relationship between 
district revenue and district wealth but it goes further by controlling for the effect 
of the district tax rate.  The multiple regression consisted of two steps.  The first 
step determined the effect that the local district tax rate had on the district 
revenue.  The second step determined the effect that both the district tax rate 
and district wealth had on revenue. The change in R2 from step one to step two 
is the amount measured.  Once again the closer the change in R2 is to zero the 
weaker the relationship between district revenue and district wealth, which is 
equated to movement toward equity. 
Table 9 contains the change in R2 by school district type for the 12-year 
time period.  The change in R2 ranged from .5537 (2000) to .6416 (2011) for 
elementary school districts.  Only 3 years (2002, 2007, and 2008) indicated 
improvement in the equity index compared to the previous year.  Except for a few 
years, the equity indices continued to decline during the time period for 
elementary school districts.  The high school districts had indices that ranged 
from .7480 (2003) to .8673 (2008).  There were 4 years (2001, 2003, 2006, and 
2009) where high school districts had improved equity indices compared to the 
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previous year.  Although the indices for high school districts were more erratic 
and values were larger than elementary school districts, the indices worsened 
over the time period similar to the elementary school districts.  Unit school 
districts had the lowest (most equitable) values for the change in R2 indices 
among the various school district types and ranged from .2863 (2005) to .3748 
(2000).  Unit school districts also had six years where the equity indices 
improved over the previous year, with 5 years running consecutively from 2001 to 
2005.  After 2005 the indices for unit school districts steadily became less 
equitable (except for 2008) and ended up at .3723 in 2011 not very different from 
the index of .3748 in 2000. 
Comparison across measures.  When analyzing data across all four 
equity measures and school district types that appear in Tables 6 through 9, 
some major findings emerge.  Unit school districts consistently had the more 
equitable indices and elementary school districts were second.  For the most part 
elementary and unit school districts had equity indices that worsened over the 
12-year time period across the four equity measures.  High school districts had 
the less equitable indices over the four measures.  However, the equity indices 
for high school districts improved over the 12-year period for all measures except 
for the conditional wealth neutrality. 
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Note. The median is the median level of district revenues per pupil. The equity improved column is based upon a comparison to the prior  
year.  
 
 
Table 6 
 
McLoone Index by School District Type 
 Elementary  High School  Unit   
Year Median Index Equity 
Improved 
 Median Index Equity 
Improved 
 Median Index Equity 
Improved 
 Foundation 
Level 
2000 $4,978 .9098 NA  $7,051 .8292 NA  $4,881 .9522 NA  $4,325 
2001 $5,166 .9043   $7,321 .8195   $4,989 .9520   $4,425 
2002 $5,347 .9114 Y  $7,392 .8444 Y  $5,224 .9494   $4,560 
2003 $5,437 .9098   $7,820 .8182   $5,295 .9477   $4,560 
2004 $5,736 .9164 Y  $8,061 .8340 Y  $5,612 .9453   $4,810 
2005 $6,067 .9063   $8,622 .8156   $5,840 .9465 Y  $4,964 
2006 $6,404 .9051   $8,874 .8230 Y  $6,119 .9449   $5,164 
2007 $6,660 .9090 Y  $9,089 .8285 Y  $6,395 .9430   $5,334 
2008 $7,173 .9087   $9,495 .8433 Y  $6,835 .9486 Y  $5,734 
2009 $7,604 .9058   $10,083 .8361   $7,162 .9438   $5,959 
2010 $8,006 .8975   $10,378 .8423 Y  $7,394 .9419   $6,119 
2011 $8,305 .8807   $10,827 .8362   $7,483 .9364   $6,119 
  
7
8
 
Note.  The equity improved column is based upon a comparison to the prior year. 
Table 7 
Coefficient of Variation by School District Type 
 Elementary  High School  Unit   
Year Index Equity 
Improved 
  Index Equity 
Improved 
  Index Equity 
Improved 
  Foundation 
Level 
2000 28.81 NA   33.92 NA   14.07 NA   $4,325 
2001 29.00    32.38 Y   14.63    $4,425 
2002 28.00 Y   31.05 Y   14.04 Y   $4,560 
2003 28.93    31.27    14.60    $4,560 
2004 29.61    30.45 Y   13.84 Y   $4,810 
2005 29.95    30.35 Y   13.52 Y   $4,964 
2006 31.22    29.91 Y   13.94    $5,164 
2007 31.33    30.39    14.19    $5,334 
2008 31.33    30.18 Y   14.36    $5,734 
2009 31.90    30.53    15.52    $5,959 
2010 32.86    31.43    16.79    $6,119 
2011 34.86    32.14    17.93    $6,119 
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Note.  The equity improved column is based upon a comparison to the prior year. 
 
Table 8 
Wealth Neutrality Criterion by School District Type: Simple Regression Coefficient 
 Elementary  High School  Unit   
Year Index Equity 
Improved 
  Index Equity 
Improved 
  Index Equity 
Improved 
  Foundation 
Level 
2000 .2306 NA   .4539 NA   .1498 NA   $4,325 
2001 .2356    .4452 Y   .1501    $4,425 
2002 .2313 Y   .4345 Y   .1412 Y   $4,560 
2003 .2464    .4397    .1455    $4,560 
2004 .2436 Y   .4096 Y   .1456    $4,810 
2005 .2443    .4041 Y   .1433 Y   $4,964 
2006 .2561    .3885 Y   .1459    $5,164 
2007 .2496 Y   .3627 Y   .1355 Y   $5,334 
2008 .2526    .3567 Y   .1289 Y   $5,734 
2009 .2558    .3491 Y   .1323    $5,959 
2010 .2666    .3469 Y   .1399    $6,119 
2011 .2919    .3673    .1509    $6,119 
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Note.  The equity improved column is based upon a comparison to the prior year. 
 
Table 9 
 
Conditional Wealth Neutrality Criterion by School District Type: Change in R2 
 Elementary  High School  Unit   
Year Index Equity 
Improved 
  Index Equity 
Improved 
  Index Equity 
Improved 
  Foundation 
Level 
2000 .5537 NA   .7576 NA   .3748 NA   $4,325 
2001 .5590    .7540 Y   .3488 Y   $4,425 
2002 .5540 Y   .7629    .3123 Y   $4,560 
2003 .5722    .7480 Y   .2989 Y   $4,560 
2004 .5801    .8067    .2937 Y   $4,810 
2005 .5923    .8463    .2863 Y   $4,964 
2006 .6092    .8319 Y   .2910    $5,164 
2007 .6027 Y   .8559    .3164    $5,334 
2008 .5995 Y   .8673    .3065 Y   $5,734 
2009 .6116    .8542 Y   .3517    $5,959 
2010 .6139    .8633    .3606    $6,119 
2011 .6416    .8648    .3723    $6,119 
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Research Question 2 
When eliminating the PTELL adjustment in the Illinois GSA formula 
and holding the entitlement constant by increasing the foundation 
level, what are the equity indices in the GSA funding system from 
Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2011 as computed by the four 
standard equity measures: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, 
simple regression coefficient, and multiple regression change in the 
coefficient of determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and 
differences in the results? 
 
This research question dealt with a simulation of the Illinois funding 
system that consisted of recalculating the GSA formula without the PTELL 
adjustment for the 12-year period.  The cost associated with the PTELL 
adjustment was used to increase the GSA foundation level.  The McLoone Index 
and coefficient of variation were used to measure the horizontal equity in the 
system.  The simple regression coefficient and multiple regression change in the 
coefficient of determination were used to measure the equal opportunity (wealth 
neutrality) of the funding system.  Tables 10 through 13 contain the data 
regarding one of the equity measures for the three school district types 
(elementary, high school, and unit).  The simulated foundation level displays the 
dollar and percentage change in the foundation level due to the simulation and is 
repeated on each of the tables. 
McLoone index.  The formula for calculating the McLoone Index utilizes 
the revenues per pupil for each school district and the median level of revenues 
per pupil by school district type.  The index is a ratio of the sum of revenues per 
pupil for school districts below the median level to the sum if all pupils below the 
median were at the median level.  The closer the index is to 1 the more 
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horizontal equity is associated with the funding system.  The revenues were 
defined as the sum of General State Aid, corporate personal property 
replacement tax, and local property tax revenue.   
As shown in Table 10, unit school districts had the more equitable 
simulated indices over the time period ranging from .9303 (2011) to .9719 (2008) 
and the simulated index improved over the baseline index in all years except for 
2011.  The McLoone Index for elementary school districts ranged from .8835 
(2011) to .9258 (2004) and the simulated indices improved in all years except for 
2001, 2009, and 2010.  Finally high school districts had indices that ranged from 
.8229 (2001) to .8704 (2009) and the simulated indices improved in all years 
except for 2004. 
Coefficient of variation.  The purpose of the coefficient of variation is to 
measure the disparity in the revenues per pupil by school district type.  This was 
the second measure used to assess the horizontal equity in the funding system.  
The same definitions for district revenues and student counts were used.  The 
index is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean and 
multiplying by 100.  The closer the index is to zero the more horizontal equity that 
is associated with the funding system. 
Table 11 shows that unit school districts had the more equitable simulated 
indices, with values ranging from 12.47 (2006) to 15.59 (2011).  Although the 
simulated indices improved over the baseline indices in every year, the equity still 
worsened over the 12-year time period.  The simulated indices for elementary 
school districts ranged from 27.72 in 2002 to 32.61 in 2011.  Every year the 
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simulated indices improved compared to the baseline indices.  Also like unit 
school districts, the simulated equity indices worsened over time.  The simulated 
indices for high school districts ranged from 27.88 (2009) to 33.69 (2000).  The 
simulated indices were more equitable compared to the baseline indices for 
every year.  However, unlike the elementary and unit school districts, the 
simulated indices for high school districts became more equitable over the time 
period. 
Simple regression coefficient.  The regression coefficient was used to 
measure the wealth neutrality of the funding system.  School district revenue per 
pupil was used as the dependent variable and school district wealth (equalized 
assessed valuation per pupil) was used as the independent variable.  The less of 
a relationship between district revenue and wealth (regression coefficient closer 
to zero) the more wealth neutral or more equitable is the funding system.   
In reviewing the indices in Table 12, it can be seen that unit school 
districts had the lowest (most equitable) values of the simulated indices that 
ranged from .0954 (2009) to .1475 (2000).  Elementary school districts had a 
range of .2118 in 2009 to .2552 in 2011 for the simulated indices.  High school 
districts began the time period at .4498 and steadily improved to .2959 in 2010.  
There was a worsening of the simulated indices to .3238 in 2011.  The simulated 
indices improved every year for all three school district types.  For the most part, 
high school districts and unit school districts had simulated indices that steadily 
decreased (was more equitable) over the 12-year period.  The simulated indices 
for elementary school districts were a little more erratic and ended up less 
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equitable. 
Multiple regression.  A multiple regression was used to measure 
conditional wealth neutrality.  This measure is similar to wealth neutrality, in that, 
it provides a calculation to determine the strength of the relationship between 
district revenue and district wealth but it goes further by controlling for the effect 
of the district tax rate.  The multiple regression consisted of two steps.  The first 
step determined the effect that the local school district tax rate had on the school 
district revenue.  The second step determined the effect that both the district tax 
rate and district wealth had on revenue.  The change in R2 for step one to step 
two is the amount measured.  Once again the closer the change in R2 is to zero 
the weaker the relationship between school district revenue and wealth, which is 
equated to movement toward equity. 
Table 13 contains the change in R2 by school district type for the 12-year 
time period.  The simulated change in R2 ranged from .5416 (2009) to .5981 
(2011) for elementary school districts.  The high school districts had a simulated 
index that ranged from .7377 (2003) to .8300 (2005).  Unit school districts had 
the lowest (more equitable) values for the simulated change in R2 index that 
ranged from .2394 (2006) to .3703 (2000). 
All school district types had improved equity indices, across all years, 
when the simulated index was compared to the baseline index.  When analyzing 
the pattern of the simulated index, the values for elementary and high school 
districts fluctuated up and down throughout the time period.  However, the 
pattern for unit school districts was improvement for 6 years and then the values 
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fluctuated like the elementary and high school districts.   
Comparison across measures.  When analyzing data across all four 
equity measures and school district types that appear in Tables 10 through 13, 
some major findings emerge.  Unit school districts consistently had the most 
equitable simulated equity indices and elementary school districts were second.  
For the most part elementary school districts had equity indices that worsened 
across all four equity measures.  Unit school districts had simulated equity 
indices that worsened over the 12-year period when analyzing the McLoone 
Index and coefficient of variation but had improvement in the simulated indices 
for the simple and multiple regressions.  High school districts had the least 
equitable simulated indices over the measures.  However, the equity indices for 
high school districts improved over the 12-year period for all measures except for 
the conditional wealth neutrality. 
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Table 10 
 
McLoone Index by School District Type Baseline Compared to Simulated (Elimination of PTELL Adjustment) 
 
 Elementary  High School  Unit  Simulated 
Foundation Level 
Year Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  $ Change % Change 
2000 .9098 .9123 Y .8292 .8311 Y .9522 .9527 Y 36 0.83 
2001 .9043 .9037  .8195 .8229 Y .9520 .9524 Y 41 0.93 
2002 .9114 .9183 Y .8444 .8487 Y .9494 .9541 Y 71 1.56 
2003 .9098 .9234 Y .8182 .8305 Y .9477 .9487 Y 146 3.20 
2004 .9164 .9258 Y .8340 .8315  .9453 .9504 Y 140 2.91 
2005 .9063 .9209 Y .8156 .8400 Y .9465 .9477 Y 242 4.88 
2006 .9051 .9063 Y .8230 .8514 Y .9449 .9653 Y 390 7.55 
2007 .9090 .9111 Y .8285 .8627 Y .9430 .9702 Y 419 7.86 
2008 .9087 .9128 Y .8433 .8627 Y .9486 .9719 Y 514 8.96 
2009 .9058 .9044  .8361 .8704 Y .9438 .9573 Y 707 11.86 
2010 .8975 .8873  .8423 .8486 Y .9419 .9510 Y 738 12.06 
2011 .8807 .8835 Y .8362 .8474 Y .9364 .9303  632 10.33 
Note.  When comparing simulated to baseline a “Y” indicates an improvement in the equity measure. 
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Table 11 
 
Coefficient of Variation by School District Type Baseline Compared to Simulated (Elimination of PTELL Adjustment) 
 
 Elementary  High School  Unit  Simulated 
Foundation Level 
Year Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  $ Change % Change 
2000 28.81 28.53 Y 33.92 33.69 Y 14.07 13.91 Y 36 0.83 
2001 29.00 28.74 Y 32.38 32.16 Y 14.63 14.48 Y 41 0.93 
2002 28.00 27.72 Y 31.05 30.65 Y 14.04 13.80 Y 71 1.56 
2003 28.93 27.98 Y 31.27 30.47 Y 14.60 13.95 Y 146 3.20 
2004 29.61 28.78 Y 30.45 29.71 Y 13.84 13.25 Y 140 2.91 
2005 29.95 28.99 Y 30.35 29.12 Y 13.52 12.54 Y 242 4.88 
2006 31.22 29.36 Y 29.91 28.18 Y 13.94 12.47 Y 390 7.55 
2007 31.33 29.34 Y 30.39 28.61 Y 14.19 12.67 Y 419 7.86 
2008 31.33 29.24 Y 30.18 28.14 Y 14.36 12.57 Y 514 8.96 
2009 31.90 29.06 Y 30.53 27.88 Y 15.52 13.08 Y 707 11.86 
2010 32.86 30.11 Y 31.43 28.82 Y 16.79 14.25 Y 738 12.06 
2011 34.86 32.61 Y 32.14 29.95 Y 17.93 15.59 Y 632 10.33 
Note.  When comparing simulated to baseline a “Y” indicates an improvement in the equity measure. 
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Table 12 
 
Wealth Neutrality Criterion by School District Type:  Simple Regression Coefficient Baseline Compared to Simulated 
(Elimination of PTELL Adjustment) 
 
 Elementary  High School  Unit  Simulated 
Foundation Level 
Year Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  $ Change % Change 
2000 .2306 .2271 Y .4539 .4498 Y .1498 .1475 Y 36 0.83 
2001 .2356 .2317 Y .4452 .4405 Y .1501 .1467 Y 41 0.93 
2002 .2313 .2264 Y .4345 .4275 Y .1412 .1360 Y 71 1.56 
2003 .2464 .2336 Y .4397 .4241 Y .1455 .1353 Y 146 3.20 
2004 .2436 .2316 Y .4096 .3955 Y .1456 .1363 Y 140 2.91 
2005 .2443 .2259 Y .4041 .3802 Y .1433 .1276 Y 242 4.88 
2006 .2561 .2272 Y .3885 .3533 Y .1459 .1217 Y 390 7.55 
2007 .2496 .2193 Y .3627 .3267 Y .1355 .1093 Y 419 7.86 
2008 .2526 .2183 Y .3567 .3140 Y .1289 .1009 Y 514 8.96 
2009 .2558 .2118 Y .3491 .2967 Y .1323 .0954 Y 707 11.86 
2010 .2666 .2230 Y .3469 .2959 Y .1399 .0955 Y 738 12.06 
2011 .2919 .2552 Y .3673 .3238 Y .1509 .1121 Y 632 10.33 
Note.  When comparing simulated to baseline a “Y” indicates an improvement in the equity measure. 
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Table 13 
 
Conditional Wealth Neutrality Criterion by School District Type: Change in R2 Baseline Compared to Simulated 
(Elimination of PTELL Adjustment) 
 
 Elementary  High School  Unit  Simulated 
Foundation Level 
Year Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  $ Change % Change 
2000 .5537 .5489 Y .7576 .7554 Y .3748 .3703 Y 36 0.83 
2001 .5590 .5523 Y .7540 .7498 Y .3488 .3394 Y 41 0.93 
2002 .5540 .5418 Y .7629 .7605 Y .3123 .2977 Y 71 1.56 
2003 .5722 .5539 Y .7480 .7377 Y .2989 .2787 Y 146 3.20 
2004 .5801 .5608 Y .8067 .7967 Y .2937 .2746 Y 140 2.91 
2005 .5923 .5510 Y .8463 .8300 Y .2863 .2539 Y 242 4.88 
2006 .6092 .5599 Y .8319 .8010 Y .2910 .2394 Y 390 7.55 
2007 .6027 .5525 Y .8559 .8220 Y .3164 .2558 Y 419 7.86 
2008 .5995 .5437 Y .8673 .8250 Y .3065 .2445 Y 514 8.96 
2009 .6116 .5416 Y .8542 .8012 Y .3517 .2705 Y 707 11.86 
2010 .6139 .5504 Y .8633 .8137 Y .3606 .2643 Y 738 12.06 
2011 .6416 .5981 Y .8648 .8288 Y .3723 .2966 Y 632 10.33 
Note.  When comparing simulated to baseline a “Y” indicates an improvement in the equity measure. 
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Research Question 3 
When eliminating the Hold Harmless component in the Illinois GSA 
formula and holding the entitlement constant by increasing the 
foundation level, what are the equity indices in the GSA funding system 
from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2010 as computed by the 
four standard equity measures: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, 
simple regression coefficient, and multiple regression change in the 
coefficient of determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and 
differences in the results? 
 
This research question dealt with a simulation of the Illinois funding 
system that consisted of recalculating the GSA formula without the GSA Hold 
Harmless component for the 11-year period.  The cost associated with the GSA 
Hold Harmless component was used to increase the GSA foundation level.  The 
McLoone Index and coefficient of variation were used to measure the horizontal 
equity in the system.  The simple regression coefficient and multiple regression 
change in the coefficient of determination were used to measure the equal 
opportunity (wealth neutrality and conditional wealth neutrality) of the funding 
system.  Tables 14 through 17 contain the data regarding one of the equity 
measures for the three school district types (elementary, high school, and unit).  
The simulated foundation level displays the dollar and percentage change in the 
foundation level due to the simulation and is repeated on each of the tables.   
McLoone index.  The formula for calculating the McLoone Index utilizes 
the revenues per pupil for each school district and the median level of revenues 
per pupil by school district type.  The index is a ratio of the sum of revenues per 
pupil for school districts below the median level to the sum if all pupils below the 
median were at the median level.  The closer the index is to 1 the more 
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horizontal equity is associated with the funding system.  The revenues were 
defined as the sum of General State Aid, corporate personal property 
replacement tax, and local property tax revenue.   
As shown in Table 14, unit school districts had the more equitable 
simulated indices over the time period ranging from .9421 (2010) to .9525 (2000) 
and the simulated indices improved over the baseline indices in all years except 
for 2009.  The simulated indices for elementary school districts ranged from 
.8987 (2010) to .9164 (2004) and the simulated index improved in all years 
except for 2004 and 2009.  Finally high school districts had indices that ranged 
from .8173 (2005) to .8448 (2002) and the simulated indices improved in all 
years. 
Coefficient of variation.  The purpose of the coefficient of variation is to 
measure the disparity in the revenues per pupil by school district type.  This was 
the second measure used to assess the horizontal equity in the funding system.  
The same definitions for district revenues and student counts were used.  The 
index is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean and 
multiplying by 100.  The closer the index is to zero the more horizontal equity that 
is associated with the funding system. 
Table 15 shows that the unit school districts had the more equitable 
simulated indices with values ranging from 13.45 (2005) to 16.69 (2010).  The 
simulated indices for elementary school districts ranged from 27.81 in 2002 to 
32.73 in 2010.  Finally, the simulated indices for high school districts ranged from 
29.84 (2006) to 33.70 (2000).  Every year the simulated indices were more 
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equitable compared to the baseline indices for all school district types.  However, 
unlike the elementary and unit school districts, the simulated indices for high 
school districts became more equitable over the time period. 
Simple regression coefficient.  The regression coefficient was used to 
measure the wealth neutrality of the funding system.  School district revenue per 
pupil was used as the dependent variable and school district wealth (equalized 
assessed valuation per pupil) was used as the independent variable.  The 
weaker the relationship between district revenue and wealth (regression 
coefficient closer to zero) the more wealth neutral or more equitable is the 
funding system.   
In reviewing the indices in Table 16, unit school districts had the lowest 
values (most equitable) of the simulated indices that ranged from .1283 (2008) to 
.1481 (2000).  Elementary school districts had a range of .2272 in 2000 to .2651 
in 2010 for the simulated indices.  High school districts began the time period at 
.4501 and steadily improved to .3455 in 2010.  The simulated index improved 
over the baseline index every year for all three school district types. For the most 
part, high school districts and unit school districts had simulated indices that 
steadily improved over the time period.  However, the simulated indices for 
elementary school districts became less equitable over the time period. 
Multiple regression.  A multiple regression was used to measure 
conditional wealth neutrality.  This measure is similar to wealth neutrality, in that, 
it provides a calculation to determine the strength of the relationship between 
district revenue and district wealth but it goes further by controlling for the effect 
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of the district tax rate.  The multiple regression consisted of two steps.  The first 
step determined the effect that the local school district tax rate had on the school 
district revenue.  The second step determined the effect that both the district tax 
rate and district wealth had on revenue.  The change in R2 from step one and 
step two is the amount measured.  Once again the closer the change in R2 is to 
zero the weaker the relationship between school district revenue and wealth, 
which is equated to movement toward equity. 
Table 17 contains the change in R2 by school district type for the 11-year 
period.  The simulated change in R2 ranged from .5493 (2000) to .6127 (2010) 
for elementary school districts.  The high school districts had a simulated index 
that ranged from .7457 (2003) to .8672 (2008).  Finally, unit school districts had 
the lowest (most equitable) values for the simulated change in R2 among the 
different school district types and ranged from .2851 (2005) to .3736 (2000). 
High school and unit districts had improved equity indices, across all 
years, when the simulated index was compared to the baseline index.  
Elementary school districts had improved equity indices all years except for 
2009.  When analyzing the trend of the simulated index, the values for 
elementary and high school districts fluctuated up and down throughout the time 
period.  However, the trend for unit school districts was improvement for 5 years 
and then the values fluctuated like the other school district types.   
Comparison across measures.  When analyzing data across all four 
equity measures and school district types, unit school districts consistently had 
the most equitable simulated equity indices and elementary school districts were 
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second.  For the most part elementary school districts had equity indices that 
worsened across all four equity measures.  Unit school districts had simulated 
equity indices that worsened over the 11-year period when analyzing the 
McLoone Index and coefficient of variation, but had improvement in the simulated 
indices for the simple and multiple regressions.  High school districts had the less 
equitable simulated indices over the four measures.  However, the equity indices 
for high school districts improved over the 11-year period for all measures except 
for the conditional wealth neutrality. 
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Table 14 
 
McLoone Index by School District Type Baseline Compared to Simulated (Elimination of Hold Harmless   
Component) 
 
 Elementary  High School  Unit  Simulated 
Foundation Level 
Year Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  $ Change % Change 
2000 .9098 .9127 Y .8292 .8296 Y .9522 .9525 Y 33 0.76 
2001 .9043 .9063 Y .8195 .8246 Y .9520 .9524 Y 44 0.99 
2002 .9114 .9115 Y .8444 .8448 Y .9494 .9496 Y 23 0.50 
2003 .9098 .9120 Y .8182 .8200 Y .9477 .9480 Y 42 0.92 
2004 .9164 .9164  .8340 .8343 Y .9453 .9455 Y 24 0.50 
2005 .9063 .9080 Y .8156 .8173 Y .9465 .9466 Y 17 0.34 
2006 .9051 .9052 Y .8230 .8237 Y .9449 .9450 Y 13 0.25 
2007 .9090 .9091 Y .8285 .8291 Y .9430 .9431 Y 12 0.22 
2008 .9087 .9093 Y .8433 .8435 Y .9486 .9487 Y 15 0.26 
2009 .9058 .9022  .8361 .8363 Y .9438 .9437  15 0.25 
2010 .8975 .8987 Y .8423 .8426 Y .9419 .9421 Y 23 0.38 
Note. When comparing simulated to baseline a “Y” indicates an improvement in the equity measure. 
  
9
6
 
Table 15 
 
Coefficient of Variation by School District Type Baseline Compared to Simulated (Elimination of Hold Harmless 
Component) 
 
 Elementary  High School  Unit  Simulated 
Foundation Level 
Year Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  $ Change % Change 
2000 28.81 28.53 Y 33.92 33.70 Y 14.07 13.90 Y 33 0.76 
2001 29.00 28.63 Y 32.38 32.10 Y 14.63 14.40 Y 44 0.99 
2002 28.00 27.81 Y 31.05 30.90 Y 14.04 13.93 Y 23 0.50 
2003 28.93 28.58 Y 31.27 31.01 Y 14.60 14.39 Y 42 0.92 
2004 29.61 29.43 Y 30.45 30.31 Y 13.84 13.73 Y 24 0.50 
2005 29.95 29.82 Y 30.35 30.26 Y 13.52 13.45 Y 17 0.34 
2006 31.22 31.13 Y 29.91 29.84 Y 13.94 13.89 Y 13 0.25 
2007 31.33 31.25 Y 30.39 30.33 Y 14.19 14.14 Y 12 0.22 
2008 31.33 31.23 Y 30.18 30.10 Y 14.36 14.30 Y 15 0.26 
2009 31.90 31.80 Y 30.53 30.46 Y 15.52 15.52  15 0.25 
2010 32.86 32.73 Y 31.43 31.34 Y 16.79 16.69 Y 23 0.38 
Note.  When comparing simulated to baseline a “Y” indicates an improvement in the equity measure. 
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Table 16 
 
Wealth Neutrality Criterion by School District Type:  Simple Regression Coefficient Baseline Compared to Simulated 
(Elimination of Hold Harmless Component) 
 
 Elementary  High School  Unit  Simulated 
Foundation Level 
Year Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  $ Change % Change 
2000 .2306 .2272 Y .4539 .4501 Y .1498 .1481 Y 33 0.76 
2001 .2356 .2310 Y .4452 .4402 Y .1501 .1478 Y 44 0.99 
2002 .2313 .2290 Y .4345 .4320 Y .1412 .1400 Y 23 0.50 
2003 .2464 .2422 Y .4397 .4352 Y .1455 .1430 Y 42 0.92 
2004 .2436 .2414 Y .4096 .4073 Y .1456 .1443 Y 24 0.50 
2005 .2443 .2427 Y .4041 .4025 Y .1433 .1424 Y 17 0.34 
2006 .2561 .2550 Y .3885 .3874 Y .1459 .1453 Y 13 0.25 
2007 .2496 .2486 Y .3627 .3618 Y .1355 .1350 Y 12 0.22 
2008 .2526 .2515 Y .3567 .3557 Y .1289 .1283 Y 15 0.26 
2009 .2558 .2547 Y .3491 .3481 Y .1323 .1303 Y 15 0.25 
2010 .2666 .2651 Y .3469 .3455 Y .1399 .1389 Y 23 0.38 
Note.  When comparing simulated to baseline a “Y” indicates an improvement in the equity measure. 
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Table 17 
 
Conditional Wealth Neutrality Criterion by School District Type: Change in R2 Baseline Compared to Simulated 
(Elimination of Hold Harmless Component) 
 
 Elementary  High School  Unit  Simulated 
Foundation Level 
Year Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  $ Change % Change 
2000 .5537 .5493 Y .7576 .7559 Y .3748 .3736 Y 33 0.76 
2001 .5590 .5534 Y .7540 .7513 Y .3488 .3472 Y 44 0.99 
2002 .5540 .5512 Y .7629 .7618 Y .3123 .3112 Y 23 0.50 
2003 .5722 .5677 Y .7480 .7457 Y .2989 .2958 Y 42 0.92 
2004 .5801 .5778 Y .8067 .8057 Y .2937 .2921 Y 24 0.50 
2005 .5923 .5908 Y .8463 .8457 Y .2863 .2851 Y 17 0.34 
2006 .6092 .6081 Y .8319 .8315 Y .2910 .2902 Y 13 0.25 
2007 .6027 .6019 Y .8559 .8556 Y .3164 .3158 Y 12 0.22 
2008 .5995 .5985 Y .8673 .8672 Y .3065 .3058 Y 15 0.26 
2009 .6116 .6119   .8542 .8540 Y .3517 .3392 Y 15 0.25 
2010 .6139 .6127 Y .8633 .8629 Y .3606 .3595 Y 23 0.38 
 
Note.  When comparing simulated to baseline a “Y” indicates an improvement in the equity measure. 
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Research Question 4 
When eliminating the PTELL adjustment and Hold Harmless 
component in the Illinois GSA formula and holding the entitlement 
constant by increasing the foundation level, what are the equity indices 
in the GSA funding system from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 
2010 as computed by the four standard equity indices: McLoone Index, 
coefficient of variation, simple regression coefficient, and multiple 
regression change in the coefficient of determination (R2)?  What are 
the similarities and differences in the results? 
 
This research question dealt with a simulation of the Illinois funding system 
that consisted of recalculating the GSA formula without the PTELL adjustment and 
Hold Harmless component for the 11-year period.  The combined cost associated 
with the PTELL adjustment and Hold Harmless component was used to increase 
the GSA foundation level.  The McLoone Index and coefficient of variation were 
used to measure the horizontal equity in the system.  The simple regression 
coefficient and multiple regression change in the coefficient of determination were 
used to measure the equal opportunity (wealth neutrality and conditional wealth 
neutrality) of the funding system.  Tables 18 through 21 contain the data regarding 
one of the equity measures for the three school district types.  The simulated 
foundation level displays the dollar and percentage change in the foundation level 
due to the simulation and is repeated on each of the tables.   
McLoone index.  The formula for calculating the McLoone Index utilizes 
the revenues per pupil for each school district and the median level of revenues 
per pupil by school district type.  The index is a ratio of the sum of revenues per 
pupil for school districts below the median level to the sum if all pupils below the 
median were at the median level.  The closer the index is to 1 the more horizontal 
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equity is associated with the funding system.  The revenues were defined as the 
sum of General State Aid, corporate personal property replacement tax, and local 
property tax revenue.   
As shown in Table 18, unit school districts had more equitable simulated 
indices over the time period ranging from .9479 (2005) to .9719 (2008) and the 
simulated index improved over the baseline index in all years.  The simulated 
indices for elementary school districts ranged from .8873 (2010) to .9258 (2004) 
and the simulated indices improved in all years except for 2009 and 2010.  Finally 
high school districts had simulated indices that ranged from .8274 (2001) to .8703 
(2009) and the simulated indices improved in all years except for 2004. 
Coefficient of variation.  The purpose of the coefficient of variation is to 
measure the disparity in the revenues per pupil by school district type.  This was 
the second measure used to assess the horizontal equity in the funding system.  
The same definitions for district revenues and student counts were used.  The 
index is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean and multiplying 
by 100.  The closer the index is to zero the more horizontal equity that is 
associated with the funding system. 
Table 19 shows that the unit school districts had more equitable simulated 
indices with values ranging from 12.44 (2006) to 14.28 (2001).  The simulated 
indices for elementary school districts ranged from 27.55 in 2002 to 30.01 in 2010.  
The simulated indices for high school districts ranged from 27.83 (2009) to 33.50 
(2000).  Every year the simulated index improved compared to the baseline index 
for all school district types.  However, unlike the elementary and unit school 
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districts, the simulated indices for high school districts became more equitable 
over the time period. 
Simple regression coefficient.  The regression coefficient was used to 
measure the wealth neutrality of the funding system.  School district revenue per 
pupil was used as the dependent variable and school district wealth (equalized 
assessed valuation per pupil) was used as the independent variable.  The weaker 
the relationship between district revenue and wealth (regression coefficient closer 
to zero) the more wealth neutral or more equitable is the funding system.   
In reviewing the simulated indices in Table 20, unit school districts had the 
lowest (most equitable) values of the simulated indices that ranged from .0948 
(2010) to .1460 (2000).  Elementary school districts had a range of .2110 in 2009 
to .2308 in 2003 for the simulated indices.  High school districts began the time 
period at .4466 and steadily improved to .2947 in 2010.  The simulated index 
improved every year, for all three school district types, when compared to the 
baseline index.  For the most part, high school districts and unit school districts 
had simulated indices that steadily improved over the time period.  Elementary 
school districts fluctuated over the time period and ended with an improved index 
in 2009 but less equitable in 2010. 
Multiple regression.  The multiple regression was used to measure 
conditional wealth neutrality.  This measure is similar to wealth neutrality, in that, it 
provides a calculation to determine the strength of the relationship between district 
revenue and district wealth but it goes further by controlling for the effect of the 
district tax rate.  The multiple regression consisted of two steps.  The first step 
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determined the effect that the local school district tax rate had on the school 
district revenue.  The second step determined the effect that both the district tax 
rate and district wealth had on revenue.  The change in R2 from step one to step 
two is the amount measured.  Once again the closer the change in R2 is to zero 
the weaker the relationship between school district revenue and wealth, which is 
equated to movement toward equity. 
Table 21 contains the change in R2 by school district type for the 11-year 
period.  The simulated change in R2 ranged from .5393 (2002) to .5590 (2006) for 
elementary school districts.  The high school districts had a simulated index that 
ranged from .7359 (2003) to .8293 (2005).  Unit school districts had the lowest 
(most equitable) values for the simulated indices among the different school 
district types and ranged from .2387 (2006) to .3692 (2000). 
All school district types had improved equity indices, across all years, when 
the simulated index was compared to the baseline index.  When analyzing the 
pattern of the simulated index, the values for elementary and high school districts 
fluctuated up and down throughout the time period and ended the time period 
worse.  However, the pattern for unit school districts was improvement for six 
years and then the values fluctuated like elementary and high school districts but 
still ended up with movement toward equity.   
Comparison across measures.  When analyzing data across all four 
equity measures and school district types, unit school districts consistently had the 
more equitable simulated indices and elementary school districts were second.  
For the most part elementary school districts had equity indices that worsened 
  
103 
across all equity measures except for the simple regression coefficient.  Unit 
school districts had simulated equity indices that worsened over the 11-year period 
when analyzing the McLoone Index, but for the most part had improvement in the 
coefficient of variation (except for 2010).  Unit school districts also had 
improvement in the simulated indices for the simple and multiple regressions.  
High school districts had the less equitable simulated indices over the four 
measures.  However, the equity indices for high school districts improved over the 
11-year period for all measures except for the conditional wealth neutrality. 
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Table 18 
 
McLoone Index by School District Type Baseline Compared to Simulated (Elimination of PTELL Adjustment and    
Hold Harmless Component) 
 
 Elementary  High School  Unit  Simulated 
Foundation Level 
Year Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated    $ Change % Change 
2000 .9098 .9126 Y .8292 .8315 Y .9522 .9530 Y 64 1.48 
2001 .9043 .9077 Y .8195 .8274 Y .9520 .9528 Y 80 1.81 
2002 .9114 .9185 Y .8444 .8490 Y .9494 .9543 Y 91 2.00 
2003 .9098 .9234 Y .8182 .8308 Y .9477 .9490 Y 175 3.84 
2004 .9164 .9258 Y .8340 .8317  .9453 .9505 Y 159 3.31 
2005 .9063 .9209 Y .8156 .8401 Y .9465 .9479 Y 257 5.18 
2006 .9051 .9063 Y .8230 .8514 Y .9449 .9653 Y 399 7.73 
2007 .9090 .9116 Y .8285 .8632 Y .9430 .9707 Y 428 8.02 
2008 .9087 .9128 Y .8433 .8630 Y .9486 .9719 Y 522 9.10 
2009 .9058 .9043   .8361 .8703 Y .9438 .9566 Y 719 12.07 
2010 .8975 .8873  .8423 .8499 Y .9419 .9511 Y 757 12.37 
Note.  When comparing simulated to baseline a “Y” indicates an improvement in the equity measure. 
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Table 19 
 
Coefficient of Variation by School District Type Baseline Compared to Simulated (Elimination of PTELL Adjustment 
and Hold Harmless Component) 
 
 Elementary  High School  Unit  Simulated 
Foundation Level 
Year Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  $ Change % Change 
2000 28.81 28.29 Y 33.92 33.50 Y 14.07 13.77 Y 64 1.48 
2001 29.00 28.42 Y 32.38 31.91 Y 14.63 14.28 Y 80 1.81 
2002 28.00 27.55 Y 31.05 30.53 Y 14.04 13.70 Y 91 2.00 
2003 28.93 27.75 Y 31.27 30.29 Y 14.60 13.81 Y 175 3.84 
2004 29.61 28.63 Y 30.45 29.60 Y 13.84 13.17 Y 159 3.31 
2005 29.95 28.88 Y 30.35 29.03 Y 13.52 12.49 Y 257 5.18 
2006 31.22 29.30 Y 29.91 28.13 Y 13.94 12.44 Y 399 7.73 
2007 31.33 29.29 Y 30.39 28.57 Y 14.19 12.64 Y 428 8.02 
2008 31.33 29.20 Y 30.18 28.10 Y 14.36 12.55 Y 522 9.10 
2009 31.90 29.00 Y 30.53 27.83 Y 15.52 13.04 Y 719 12.07 
2010 32.86 30.01 Y 31.43 28.75 Y 16.79 14.19 Y 757 12.37 
Note.  When comparing simulated to baseline a “Y” indicates an improvement in the equity measure. 
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Table 20 
 
Wealth Neutrality Criterion by School District Type Baseline Compared to Simulated (Elimination of PTELL 
Adjustment and Hold Harmless Component) 
 
 Elementary  High School  Unit  Simulated 
Foundation Level 
Year Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  $ Change % Change 
2000 .2306 .2242 Y .4539 .4466 Y .1498 .1460 Y 64 1.48 
2001 .2356 .2277 Y .4452 .4361 Y .1501 .1448 Y 80 1.81 
2002 .2313 .2244 Y .4345 .4253 Y .1412 .1350 Y 91 2.00 
2003 .2464 .2308 Y .4397 .4210 Y .1455 .1339 Y 175 3.84 
2004 .2436 .2299 Y .4096 .3937 Y .1456 .1353 Y 159 3.31 
2005 .2443 .2246 Y .4041 .3788 Y .1433 .1268 Y 257 5.18 
2006 .2561 .2264 Y .3885 .3525 Y .1459 .1213 Y 399 7.73 
2007 .2496 .2187 Y .3627 .3260 Y .1355 .1090 Y 428 8.02 
2008 .2526 .2178 Y .3567 .3135 Y .1289 .1006 Y 522 9.10 
2009 .2558 .2110 Y .3491 .2959 Y .1323 .0951 Y 719 12.07 
2010 .2666 .2218 Y .3469 .2947 Y .1399 .0948 Y 757 12.37 
Note.  When comparing simulated to baseline a “Y” indicates an improvement in the equity measure. 
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Table 21 
 
Conditional Wealth Neutrality Criterion by School District Type: Change in R2 Baseline Compared to Simulated 
(Elimination of PTELL Adjustment and Hold Harmless Component) 
 
 Elementary  High School  Unit  Simulated 
Foundation Level 
Year Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  Baseline Simulated  $ Change % Change 
2000 .5537 .5451 Y .7576 .7539 Y .3748 .3692 Y 64 1.48 
2001 .5590 .5472 Y .7540 .7473 Y .3488 .3381 Y 80 1.81 
2002 .5540 .5393 Y .7629 .7595 Y .3123 .2968 Y 91 2.00 
2003 .5722 .5506 Y .7480 .7359 Y .2989 .2772 Y 175 3.84 
2004 .5801 .5589 Y .8067 .7959 Y .2937 .2734 Y 159 3.31 
2005 .5923 .5495 Y .8463 .8293 Y .2863 .2528 Y 257 5.18 
2006 .6092 .5590 Y .8319 .8006 Y .2910 .2387 Y 399 7.73 
2007 .6027 .5517 Y .8559 .8216 Y .3164 .2552 Y 428 8.02 
2008 .5995 .5430 Y .8673 .8247 Y .3065 .2441 Y 522 9.10 
2009 .6116 .5407 Y .8542 .8007 Y .3517 .2699 Y 719 12.07 
2010 .6139 .5490 Y .8633 .8129 Y .3606 .2630 Y 757 12.37 
Note.  When comparing simulated to baseline a “Y” indicates an improvement in the equity measure. 
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Research Question 5 
What are the similarities and differences in the equity indices 
between and across the different simulations? 
 
This research question was used to compare the four simulations of the 
study.  This study included the analysis of four simulations of the Illinois funding 
system.  The first simulation was the funding system in place.  Second was the 
elimination of the PTELL adjustment to increase the GSA foundation level.  The 
third simulation was the elimination of the GSA Hold Harmless component to 
increase the GSA foundation level.  Finally, the last simulation combined the 
elimination of the PTELL adjustment and GSA Hold Harmless component to 
increase the GSA foundation level.  The equity measures used to analyze the 
simulations were the McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, simple regression 
coefficient, multiple regression (change in R2).  As in the previous questions, the 
findings are organized by equity measure. 
McLoone index.  The first simulation contained the baseline McLoone 
indices that were compared to the prior year to see if there was progress toward 
equity in the funding system.  The baseline indices were rather erratic with the 
values shifting up and down throughout the time period.  Consistently, across all 
four research questions, the McLoone Index indicated more equity for unit school 
districts and less equity for high school districts in the funding system.  There 
was improvement in the simulated equity indices (for the last three simulations) in 
89% of the years when compared to the baseline equity indices.  The main 
purpose of the last three simulations was to compare to the baseline indices of 
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the funding system to see how each simulation affected equity.  However, it was 
interesting to note that when the simulated index was compared to the prior year 
simulated index there were additional years that had improvement in equity.  This 
means that the simulations helped (to a small degree) create a more improved 
equity pattern over time. 
Coefficient of variation.  In reviewing the coefficient of variation across 
the four simulations some interesting patterns emerged.  Unit school districts still 
had the highest level of equity in the school funding system.  However, the 
simulated equity indices for elementary and high school districts were very close 
with the high school districts having just slightly worse equity indices.  The 
simulated indices improved over the baseline indices for every year and all 
school district types except for one year (2009) where the indices were the same 
for unit school districts.  The third simulation (elimination of GSA Hold Harmless) 
had the smallest impact on the equity indices.  Although the main purpose was to 
compare the simulated to baseline indices (for the same year), when comparing 
simulated to prior year simulated there was improvement in the trend for 
simulations eliminating the PTELL adjustment.   
Simple regression coefficient.  The findings for the wealth neutrality 
measure were similar to the earlier equity measures.  Unit school districts had 
the highest level of equity in the school funding system with high school districts 
being third.  The simulated equity indices improved over the baseline indices for 
every year and across school district types.  When comparing the simulated 
equity indices to the prior year there was quite a bit of improvement, especially 
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for unit school districts, for the simulations that eliminated the PTELL adjustment.  
The simulated indices showed more of a pattern of progress toward equity for 
unit and high school districts with elementary school districts progressing at a 
lesser degree.  
Multiple regression.  Some of the same findings were discovered for this 
measure as was seen in the previous equity measure.  Unit school districts had 
the most equity in the school funding system with high school districts coming in 
third.  The baseline equity indices were erratic for elementary and high school 
districts, but less so for unit school districts.  Also, the simulated equity indices 
improved over the baseline indices for every year except for elementary school 
districts in 2009.  Although the simulated equity indices improved over the 
baseline indices in the third simulation (elimination of GSA Hold Harmless) there 
was minimal impact on the values or improvement over the previous year. 
However, there were some different patterns that emerged when 
analyzing the conditional wealth neutrality measure (change in R2) for the 
simulations that eliminated the PTELL adjustment.  When comparing the 
simulated indices to the prior year for unit school districts there were 6 years of 
improvement before fluctuating back and forth with decreases in 2007 and 2009.  
Also, high school districts had only 4 years (2001, 2003, 2006, and 2009) across 
all simulations where the equity indices improved over the prior year (baseline 
and simulated).  Finally, when comparing simulated equity indices to the prior 
year for elementary school districts the change was from 3 years of improvement 
to 5 years (2002, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009). 
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Comparison across measures.  Regardless of which equity measure 
was used unit school districts were always indicated to have the most equity in 
the school funding system and high school districts were always indicated to 
have the least equity.  The simulations of eliminating the PTELL adjustment, 
GSA Hold Harmless component or combination of the two almost always 
resulted in the improvement of the equity indices.  The few exceptions were 
either in the calculation for the McLoone Index or the simulation that only 
eliminated the GSA Hold Harmless.   
 112 
    
          
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary of the Study 
Statement of the Problem 
Funding of public school students in Illinois is not considered to be 
equitable.  Many research studies have been conducted to gauge the level of 
equity in the Illinois funding system at various points in time during the past four 
decades.  For the most part, the findings of the studies detailed in Chapter II 
reveal inequity in the Illinois funding structure.  In Illinois, many 
committees/commissions/task forces have been created to study school funding.  
Although many reports have been produced, few of the proposed solutions have 
been implemented by the Illinois General Assembly. The overriding themes for 
the various funding reform proposals have been increased student equity, less 
reliance on local property taxes, and a greater adequate level of funding.  Equity 
was the focus of this study because the Illinois General State Aid formula is 
based upon an equalization of state and local funds, and it was important to 
analyze how well that equalization factor works. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact that the Property 
Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL) adjustment and the Hold Harmless 
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component of the General State Aid Formula have on the equity of the Illinois 
funding system.  The timeline for the study was determined to be Fiscal Years 
2000 to 2011.   
Research Questions 
1. What were the equity indices in the Illinois GSA funding system from 
Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2011 as computed by the four 
standard equity measures: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, 
simple regression coefficient, and multiple regression change in the 
coefficient of determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and 
differences in the results? 
 
2. When eliminating the PTELL adjustment in the Illinois GSA formula and 
holding the entitlement constant by increasing the foundation level, 
what are the equity indices in the GSA funding system from Fiscal Year 
2000 through Fiscal Year 2011 as computed by the four standard equity 
measures: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, simple regression 
coefficient, and multiple regression change in the coefficient of 
determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and differences in the 
results? 
 
3. When eliminating the Hold Harmless component in the Illinois GSA 
formula and holding the entitlement constant by increasing the 
foundation level, what are the equity indices in the GSA funding system 
from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2010 as computed by the 
four standard equity measures: McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, 
simple regression coefficient, and multiple regression change in the 
coefficient of determination (R2)?  What are the similarities and 
differences in the results? 
 
4. When eliminating the PTELL adjustment and Hold Harmless component 
in the Illinois GSA formula and holding the entitlement constant by 
increasing the foundation level, what are the equity indices in the GSA 
funding system from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2010 as 
computed by the four standard equity indices: McLoone Index, 
coefficient of variation, simple regression coefficient, and multiple 
regression change in the coefficient of determination (R2)?  What are 
the similarities and differences in the results? 
 
5. What are the similarities and differences in the equity indices between 
and across the different simulations? 
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Summary of Methodology and Statistical Techniques 
 
This study involved five major steps to address the research questions.  In 
the first step, the GSA formula was calculated and then the equity indices were 
determined for each of the Fiscal Years from 2000 through 2011.  This first step 
provided the baseline data for comparison purposes for each of the next four 
simulations.  In step two, the PTELL adjustment in the GSA formula was 
eliminated and, while holding the entitlement constant, the foundation level was 
increased for each of the Fiscal Years 2000 through 2011.  The specified equity 
indices were calculated.  Step three eliminated the GSA Hold Harmless 
component of the GSA formula and, while holding the entitlement constant, the 
foundation level was increased for each of the Fiscal Years 2000 through 2010.  
The specified equity indices were calculated.  Step four combined the elimination 
of both the PTELL adjustment and the GSA Hold Harmless component.  The 
entitlement amount was held constant and the foundation level was increased for 
each of the Fiscal Years 2000 through 2010.  Once again, the specified equity 
indices were calculated.  Finally, in step five, all of the equity indices were 
compared across and within the various simulations and school district types. 
Horizontal equity and equal opportunity (wealth neutrality and conditional 
wealth neutrality) were the two equity criteria analyzed in the study.  The 
McLoone Index and coefficient of variation were the equity measures for 
analyzing horizontal equity.  Wealth neutrality was measured using the 
regression coefficient from a simple regression.  Finally, the change in R2 from a 
multiple regression was used to measure conditional wealth neutrality.    
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Summary of Findings 
Research Question 1 
This question dealt with calculating the equity indices for the Illinois 
funding system over the specified time period.  When analyzing data across all 
four equity measures and school district types that appear in Tables 6 through 9, 
some major findings emerge.  Unit school districts consistently had the more 
equitable equity indices, with elementary school districts second, and high school 
districts least equitable.  For the most part, elementary and unit school districts 
had equity indices that worsened over the 12-year time period across the four 
equity measures.  High school districts had the least equitable indices over the 
four measures.  However, the equity indices for high school districts improved 
over the 12-year period for all measures except for the conditional wealth 
neutrality. 
There was not a clear pattern or trend in reviewing the equity indices for 
the 12-year period, four equity measures, and three school district types.  It is 
logical that when the GSA foundation level did not increase in 2003 and 2011, 
the equity indices for the McLoone Index, coefficient of variation, and simple 
regression coefficient for all school district types worsened.  However, there were 
other years, such as 2009, where the GSA foundation level did increase but the 
equity indices still worsened for all school district types (except high school 
districts for the simple regression coefficient).  The change in R2 for measuring 
conditional wealth neutrality was different than the other three measures.  The 
indices worsened in 2003 for elementary school districts, 2009 for elementary 
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and unit school districts and all school district types in 2010 and 2011. 
Generally unit school districts had the most compact range of values for 
each of the equity measures.  High school districts tended to have the widest 
dispersion in the range of values for the equity indices.  Although the indices 
across all four equity measures were generally more equitable for unit school 
districts and least equitable for high school districts, they tended to be erratic for 
all school district types.  
Research Question 2 
This simulation eliminated the PTELL adjustment in the GSA formula and 
increased the foundation level with the associated cost savings.  The equity 
indices were calculated for the simulation and compared to the baseline equity 
indices from simulation one.  When analyzing data across all four equity 
measures and school district types that appear in Tables 10 through 13, some 
major findings emerge.  Unit school districts consistently had the most equitable 
simulated equity indices, elementary school districts second, and high school 
districts were least equitable.  For the most part, elementary school districts had 
simulated equity indices that worsened across all four equity measures.  Unit 
school districts had simulated equity indices that worsened over the 12-year 
period when analyzing the McLoone Index and coefficient of variation, but had 
improvement in the simulated indices for the simple and multiple regressions.  
High school districts had the least equitable simulated indices over the four 
measures.  However, the equity indices for high school districts improved over 
the 12-year period for all measures except for the conditional wealth neutrality. 
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The main purpose of the second simulation was to determine the impact 
that the PTELL adjustment in the GSA formula had on equity in the Illinois 
funding system.  Tables 10 through 13 contain the comparison of the simulated 
equity indices to the baseline indices.  It can be seen that the simulated equity 
indices improved every year for all school district types for the coefficient of 
variation, simple regression coefficient and change in R2.  The simulated 
McLoone Index improved for all but 5 years (three for elementary school districts 
and one each for high school and unit school districts).  Although some years the 
improvement in the simulated index was minimal, this simulation of eliminating 
the PTELL adjustment certainly moved the indices toward improved equity.  Even 
though the equity indices progressed toward improved equity in the funding 
system, the erratic pattern of the values remained the same.      
Research Question 3 
This simulation eliminated the GSA Hold Harmless component and 
increased the foundation level with the associated cost savings.  The equity 
indices were calculated for the simulation and compared to the baseline equity 
indices from simulation one.  When analyzing data across all four equity 
measures and school district types, unit school districts consistently had the 
more equitable simulated indices, elementary school districts second, and high 
school districts least equitable.  For the most part elementary school districts had 
equity indices that worsened across all four equity measures.  Unit school 
districts had simulated equity indices that worsened over the 11-year period 
when analyzing the McLoone Index and coefficient of variation, but had 
  
118 
improvement in the simulated indices for the simple and multiple regressions.  
High school districts had the least equitable simulated indices over the four 
measures.  However, the equity indices for high school districts improved over 
the 11-year period for all measures except for the conditional wealth neutrality. 
The main purpose of the third simulation was to determine the impact that 
the GSA Hold Harmless component had on equity in the Illinois funding system.  
Tables 14 through 17 contain the comparison of the simulated equity indices to 
the baseline indices.  Only for the simple regression coefficient did the simulated 
equity indices improve every year for all school district types.  For the other three 
equity measures there were 1 or 2 years where there was no improvement for at 
least one of the school district types.  Although for the most part the simulated 
equity indices improved, the improvement was minimal.  This finding is not 
surprising because the associated cost of the Hold Harmless component ranged 
from only $19.6 to $65.8 million and therefore did not allow for large increases to 
the simulated GSA foundation level.    
Research Question 4 
This simulation eliminated the PTELL adjustment and GSA Hold Harmless 
component and increased the foundation level with the combined associated cost 
savings.  The equity indices were calculated for the simulation and compared to 
the baseline equity indices from simulation one.  When analyzing data across all 
four equity measures and school district types, unit school districts consistently 
had the more equitable simulated indices, elementary school districts second, 
and high school districts had the least equitable.  For the most part elementary 
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school districts had simulated equity indices that worsened across all equity 
measures except for the simple regression coefficient.  Unit school districts had 
simulated equity indices that worsened over the 11-year period when analyzing 
the McLoone Index, but for the most part had improvement in the coefficient of 
variation (except for 2010).  Unit school districts also had improvement in the 
simulated equity indices for the simple and multiple regressions.  High school 
districts had the least equitable simulated indices over the four measures.  
However, the equity indices for high school districts improved over the 11-year 
period for all measures except for the conditional wealth neutrality. 
The main purpose of the fourth simulation was to determine the impact 
that the combination of the PTELL adjustment and the GSA Hold Harmless 
component had on equity in the Illinois funding system.  Tables 18 through 21 
contain the comparison of the simulated equity indices to the baseline indices.  It 
can be seen that the simulated equity indices improved every year for all school 
district types for the coefficient of variation, simple regression coefficient and 
change in R2.  The simulated McLoone Index improved for all but 3 years (two for 
elementary school districts and one for high school districts).  The simulated 
equity indices for unit school districts improved for every year across all equity 
measures.  Although some years the improvement in the simulated index was 
minimal, this simulation of eliminating the PTELL adjustment and GSA Hold 
Harmless component certainly moved the indices toward improved equity.  
However, the erratic pattern of the values remained virtually the same. 
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Research Question 5 
Research question five dealt with analyzing across the four simulations to 
find similarities and differences.  In reviewing the data across the various 
simulations, equity measures and school district types there were a few patterns 
that emerged.  Unit school districts always had the most equity in the funding 
system.  Elementary school districts had more equitable indices than high school 
districts across all equity measures.  However, when comparing the coefficient of 
variation the indices for the elementary and high school districts were much 
closer.  The equity indices for elementary school districts seemed to be more 
erratic than the other district types, and high school districts tended to start off 
with worse equity and improve over time (except for the conditional wealth 
neutrality). 
Even though the three simulations utilized a reallocation of state revenue 
in the GSA formula and no additional revenue the various equity measures 
improved across the school district types.  This reinforces the idea that if funding 
equity is a goal of the state then analyses should be conducted to determine the 
progression of equity, especially when adjustments or components are added to 
the funding structure.      
Conclusions 
When baseline and simulated equity indices were compared across the 
equity measures the following conclusions were drawn. 
1.  Unit school districts were the most equitable across all measures and 
simulations. 
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2.  The elimination of the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law 
adjustment in the General State Aid Formula had the largest positive impact on 
equity in the Illinois funding system. 
3.  The elimination of the General State Aid Hold Harmless component 
had only a small impact on equity in the Illinois funding system.  
4.  Greater equity gains were seen in wealth neutrality (weakening the 
relationship between revenue and wealth) compared to permissible variance 
(narrowing the disparity in district revenue). 
Discussion 
Several research studies have examined the impact that the 1973 funding 
reform had on equity in the Illinois funding system.  When comparing the first 2 or 
3 years of the implementation of the funding reform, the results were the same.  
Elementary school districts made little progress toward being more equitable 
compared to unit and high school districts.  Unit school districts had the largest 
gains for wealth neutrality but did not have success on reducing the disparity in 
district expenditures.  If the investigation stopped there it might be interpreted 
that the reform was a moderate success, at least for some measures and school 
district types.  However when reviewing the long-term effects of the reform as 
Hickrod, Chaudhari, and Hubbard (1985) did from 1973 through 1986 and 
Hickrod and Chaudhari (1997) extended to 1997, a different picture emerges.  
The values for the various measures tended to be erratic, and at the end of 1986 
elementary school districts had lost any equity gains that had been seen in the 
first 2 years.  Unit and high school districts managed to retain a small amount of 
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the gains that had been made under the Resource Equalizer formula.  However, 
when the equity study was extended out to 1997 all school district types became 
less equitable with respect to the coefficient of variation, Gini Index, and 
regression coefficient.  The McLoone Index was the only measure where unit and 
high school districts had some progress toward equity from 1973 to 1997 but 
elementary school districts started to decline every year from 1988 to 1997.   
There was another push for school funding reform in the early 1990s, and 
in 1997 a new general funding formula was enacted and implemented in 1999.  
However this time there did not seem to be the same flurry of research to 
investigate the equity impact of the new formula as in the mid-1970s.  One 
reason may have been the elimination of the Illinois School Problems 
Commission.  For 40 years (1945 to 1985) the Illinois School Problems 
Commission led the way to researching educational problems including school 
funding equity and now there was no such group.  The 1997 reform created the 
Education Funding Advisory Board but the responsibilities were limited to 
recommendations on the GSA foundation level and poverty grant every other 
year.  When legislators implemented a new formula in 1973 to distribute state 
aid, there was a directive to evaluate the new formula.  By 1977 there had been 
three annual evaluations of the state goals for funding equity.  In 1997 there was 
no provision that stipulated annual evaluations of the funding system. 
The Center for the Study of Educational Finance at Illinois State University 
began studying the Illinois finance system in 1972.  By 1997 there were 25 years 
of analysis regarding the equity measures of permissible variance and wealth 
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neutrality.  No studies were found that analyzed equity for the last year (1998) of 
the 1973 reform or the new funding formula from 1999–2004.  However, the 
Illinois State Board of Education staff calculated various equity indices annually.  
These were included in an appendix of the State, Local and Federal Financing 
for Illinois Public Schools report.  The last time the report was created was 2000 
and can be found at http://www.isbe.net/sfms/html/financial_archive.htm.  Mullin 
and Brown (2009) and Verstegen and Driscoll (2008 and 2009) conducted equity 
studies utilizing data for 2005.  Although the purpose of this study was to 
evaluate how the GSA Property Tax Extension Limitation Law adjustment and 
Hold Harmless component impacted equity, it also provided a longitudinal study 
of the funding reform of 1997.  This secondary purpose allowed a comparison of 
three common equity measures (coefficient of variation, McLoone Index, and 
simple regression coefficient) of this study to Hickrod and Chaudhari (1997). 
Simulation one of this study was the calculation of baseline equity indices 
for 2000 to 2011.  There were some similarities and differences in the results of 
this study of the funding system of the 1997 reform compared to the 1973 reform 
study by Hickrod and Chaudhari (1997).  The discussion is organized by equity 
measure.  The coefficient of variation measures the disparity of district revenues.  
In both studies unit school districts were more equitable than the other district 
types.  In Hickrod and Chaudhari (1997), high school districts were more 
equitable than elementary school districts for the first 20 years but became less 
equitable in 1993.  Also, all school district types lost any progress toward equity 
by the last year of the study.  However, this study found that high school districts 
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were less equitable than elementary school districts for the first half of the study 
and then it reversed.  Also, high school districts retained some of the equity gain 
while unit and elementary school districts lost all equity gains by 2011. 
The McLoone Index measures equity for the bottom half of the distribution.  
Once again both studies indicated that unit school districts were more equitable 
but also found that high school districts had the worst equity.  Hickrod and 
Chaudhari (1997) found that unit and high school districts retained some of their 
equity gains over the 25-year period but elementary school districts ended the 
period less equitable.  The results of this study also showed that high school 
districts retained some of the equity gain but that unit and elementary school 
districts lost any gain made during the time period. 
The simple regression coefficient was used to measure the relationship 
between district revenue and wealth.  This measure is used to gauge wealth 
neutrality (equal opportunity) and the weaker the relationship between revenue 
and wealth the more equity of the funding system.  Both studies indicated that 
unit school districts were most equitable while high school districts were least 
equitable.  Hickrod and Chaudhari (1997) found that all district types lost the 
equity gains that had been made.  Elementary school districts lost their equity 
gains by 1981, high school districts by 1992, and unit school districts did not lose 
until 1997.  This study had differing results because high school districts had 
equity gains every year (the index in 2011 increased a slight amount) and ended 
the period more equitable.  Unit school districts had equity gains over the period, 
but there were some irregular patterns and in 2011 had lost all of the increased 
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equity.  Except for a few years, the relationship between revenue and wealth 
became increasingly stronger for elementary school districts, which ended at the 
strongest level in 2011. 
The findings of both studies indicated that unit school districts had less 
disparity of district revenue, less disparity in the bottom half of the population, 
and a weaker relationship between district revenue and wealth than the other 
district types.  Also, elementary school districts had more irregular indices and 
the small amount of gain in equity was lost by the end of the time period for both 
studies. 
The main difference of the two studies was the time period.  This study 
was conducted for a 12-year period, and Hickrod and Chaudhari (1997) was 
conducted for a 25-year period.  However, there was also a difference in the 
disparity in revenue for high school districts.  Revenue disparity decreased for 
high school districts under the 1973 reform for 16 years before increasing and 
ultimately losing all of the gain made.  Also, for 20 years the high school districts 
had less disparity (more equity) in district revenue than elementary school 
districts.  However, that differed from the findings of this study because for the 
first 6 years high school districts had more disparity (less equity) than elementary 
school districts and then the last 6 years it reversed.  Also, this study indicated 
that high school districts retained some of their equity gains.  If the current 
funding formula continues it would be interesting to analyze the additional years 
to see if more patterns emerge between the two studies.   
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This study added to the research on school funding equity in two ways.  
First there was examination of how two specific adjustments to the funding 
formula affected equity of the Illinois funding system.  This study may provide 
baseline data to aid in the discussion of “new” funding reform especially when 
thinking about adjustments or revisions to a formula.  Also, this study provides a 
basis for a continued longitudinal study as was seen from 1973 to 1997.  Dr. 
Hickrod was involved in many research studies that began with a study of two 
points in time and eventually expanded out to 25 years.  If the current funding 
formula stays intact, this study could provide that same basis and be extended 
over the years to provide more valuable data regarding equity in the Illinois 
funding system.          
Policy and Future Research Recommendations 
Policy Recommendations 
1.  Based on the findings that equity improved in the Illinois funding 
system when the PTELL adjustment and GSA Hold Harmless component were 
eliminated (and the cost savings used to increase the foundation level), the 
legislators should devise a system that will annually review the equity progress of 
the funding system.  This will allow policymakers to make informed decisions 
when modifying the general funding system to assure new initiatives do not 
negatively affect equity. 
2.  Whenever a new funding formula is implemented the legislators 
typically include a hold harmless provision.  However this study found that the 
GSA Hold Harmless component had a negative effect on equity in the Illinois 
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funding system.  Therefore if the legislators believe in school funding equity, then 
any hold harmless provision needs to have a time limit so there will be minimal 
impact on equity.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
1.  In this study the equity indices improved most under the simulations 
where the PTELL adjustment was eliminated, but the indices might still not be 
considered to be in acceptable ranges.  A future study could expand simulation 
two to investigate how much additional state revenue would need to be added to 
the General State Aid formula to move the equity indices into acceptable ranges. 
2.  There were very different ranges for the equity indices by school district 
type.  A future study could investigate why the Illinois funding system has such 
varying effects on equity across school district type.  This data will help improve 
the Illinois funding system to provide equity across school district types. 
3.  Analysis from this study indicated erratic patterns of equity indices 
within school district type.  A future study could replicate simulation one but add 
another level of analysis within school district type.  The subgroups would be 
school districts that are subject to PTELL versus school districts not subject to 
PTELL.  This analysis would determine if the subgroups (PTELL versus non-
PTELL) are affected differently by equity in the Illinois funding system and 
whether the erratic patterns are seen in each subgroup. 
4.  A research study by Hickrod and Chaudhari (1997) added to previous 
research and provided 25 years of equity analysis of the funding structure 
enacted in 1973.  This study spanned 12 years but, because the focus was on 
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the PTELL adjustment and GSA Hold Harmless component, did not begin with 
the first year of the formula (1999).  A future study could add 2 years to the 
beginning of this study and start in 1998 (the year before the new formula) for 
simulation one which was the baseline equity indices.  There could also be 
additional years added to the end of this study.  In 2012 to 2014 the General 
State Aid foundation level was retained at $6,119 but General State Aid was 
prorated each year due to decreased appropriations.  A decision would have to 
be made as to how to calculate the equity indices for these years when General 
State Aid was prorated.  The addition of these years would allow a more 
complete comparison to the 1973 reform longitudinal study.  
5.  This current study did not examine the role of the poverty grant on the 
equity indices.  Similar to the GSA Hold Harmless component, the poverty grant 
formula is not part of the equalization component of the GSA formula.  Further-
more, in FY 1999 low-income students were funded through a separate formula 
rather than included through weighting in the General State Aid (GSA) formula. 
Also, in FY 2004, the low-income count of the formula changed from utilizing the 
decennial Census to an annual count from the Department of Human Services 
and the formula was revised.  Yet, comparing FY 2011 to FY2004, the low-
income count in Illinois has increased by 71% and the poverty grant increased by 
222% ($418,385,465 to $1,349,108,591).  Future research could investigate the 
impact that the poverty grant has on equity of the Illinois Funding System overall 
and by the percentage of low-income students in school districts.     
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APPENDIX A 
SPENDING PER PUPIL BY SCHOOL DISTRICT TYPE 
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OPERATING EXPENDITURE PER PUPIL BY SCHOOL DISTRICT TYPE:  
MINIMUM, MAXIMUM, AND AVERAGE 
 
 Elementary High School Unit 
Year Min Max Avg Min Max Avg  Min Max Avg 
2000 $3,987 $17,871 $6,959 $5,644 $17,911 $10,765 $4,092 $11,688 $7,124 
2001 $4,297 $18,225 $7,442 $5,970 $17,636 $11,167 $4,610 $11,726 $7,546 
2002 $4,340 $18,193 $7,740 $6,509 $17,291 $11,442 $4,753 $10,824 $7,771 
2003 $4,829 $20,173 $8,125 $6,310 $17,407 $11,593 $4,894 $14,741 $8056 
2004 $4,438 $23,799 $8,362 $6,917 $17,704 $11,850 $5,042 $11,967 $8,384 
2005 $4,281 $22,508 $8,763 $6,766 $18,001 $12,004 $5,060 $28,285 $8,676 
2006 $5,144 $22,050 $9,111 $6,958 $18,592 $12,365 $5,148 $20,841 $9,078 
2007 $5,122 $23,001 $9,517 $4,803 $18,808 $12,708 $5,486 $23,726 $9,515 
2008 $5,522 $22,778 $10,034 $6,860 $20,867 $13,272 $6,009 $31,226 $10,006 
2009 $5,922 $23,449 $10,633 $8,211 $23,789 $14,260 $6,211 $26,660 $10,821 
2010 $6,174 $24,244 $11,082 $8,651 $22,489 $14,686 $6,383 $24,633 $11,370 
2011 $6,009 $25,355 $11,190 $8,799 $26,225 $14,681 $6,061 $22,561 $11,262 
Note.  Data obtained at http://webprod1.isbe.net/ilearn/asp/index.asp 
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HISTORY OF CPI USED FOR THE PROPERTY TAX EXTENSION LIMITATION 
LAW (PTELL) 
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CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI) USED FOR THE PROPERTY TAX 
EXTENSION LIMITATION LAW 
 
Levy Year Calendar Year Consumer Price Index 
1993 1992 2.9% 
1994 1993 2.7% 
1995 1994 2.7% 
1996 1995 2.5% 
1997 1996 3.6% 
1998 1997 1.5% 
1999 1998 1.6% 
2000 1999 2.7% 
2001 2000 3.4% 
2002 2001 1.6% 
2003 2002 2.4% 
2004 2003 1.9% 
2005 2004 3.3% 
2006 2005 3.4% 
2007 2006 2.5% 
2008 2007 4.1% 
2009 2008 0.1% 
2010 2009 2.7% 
2011 2010 1.5% 
2012 2011 3.0% 
Note.  Data obtained from 
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/LocalGovernment/PropertyTax/CPIhistory.pdf 
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APPENDIX C 
 
ILLINOIS COUNTIES SUBJECT TO THE PROPERTY TAX EXTENSION 
 
 LIMITATION LAW
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ILLINOIS COUNTIES THAT HAD LEGISLATION OR A REFERENDUM  
REGARDING THE PROPERTY TAX EXTENSION LAW 
 
County Year Subject to PTELL Year Referendum Failed 
Adams  1997 
Boone 1997  
Bureau  1998 
Carroll  1997 
Champaign 1997  
Christian 1997  
Coles 2003  
Cook 1994  
Cumberland 2003  
Dekalb 2000  
Dupage 1991  
Edgar  2001 
Franklin 1997  
Greene 2001  
Jackson 1997  
Jefferson 1999  
Jo Daviess 1998  
Kane 1991  
Kankakee 1997  
Kendall 1998  
La Salle  1997 
Lake 1991  
Lee 1997  
Livingston 2000  
Logan 1997  
Macoupin 1997  
Madison  1999 
Marion 1999  
Massac 2001  
McDonough 1998  
McHenry 1991  
McLean  1997 
Menard 1997  
Monroe 1997  
Morgan 1997 2003 
Moultrie  2003 
Randolph 1997  
Sangamon 1997  
Schuyler 1997  
Shelby 2001  
Stephenson 1998  
Tazewell 1999  
Union 1997  
Washington 1999  
Whiteside  1997 
Will 1991  
Williamson 1997  
Winnebago 1997  
Note.  Data obtained at 
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/LocalGovernment/PropertyTax/PTELLcounties.pdf 
